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Purpose of Study 
Political stability is an important variable in the study of 
governments, and as such is a matter of considerable interest to stu-
dents of comparative politics and international relations. In this era 
of rapid technological advancement, a matter of particular concern is 
the assumed effect upon stability wrought by social mobilization, a 
process which takes into account the various ramifications of economic, 
political and social development. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine the relationship between social mobilization and political sta-
bility as it is found to exist in 10 countries: Argentina, Canada, 
Israel, Italy, India, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, and The Philip-
pines. The primary objectives of the thesis are to determine whether 
social mobilization may significantly affect political stability, and, 
if so, the manner in which it is affected. The study should prove 
valuable in helping to determine the impact of social and economic 
development on the political process, and should contribute, at the 
same time, to an understanding of why certain social, political, and 




The concept of social mobilization used is adopted from the writ-
ings of Karl W. Deutsch, who defined it as simply "a name given to an 
overall process of change,. which happens to substantial parts of the 
population in countries moving from traditional to modern ways of 
1 
life." Continuing, Deutsch further defined social mobilization as 
denoting a concept which brackets together a number of more specific 
processes of change, such as changes of residence, of occupations, of 
social setting, of roles and ways of acting, and of experiences and 
2 
expectations. 
Political stability may be defined in any number of ways, but for 
the precision required by this study it shall be defined as the ability 
of a government or constitutional order to maintain its authority with 
a minimum of v.iolence. Purposely excluded from the definition are such 
concep.ts as democracy or dictatorship, for governments under any 
system may be found to be stable or unstable. The definition is suf-
ficientlybroad, however, to include in its purview such things as 
challenges to the government and/or' constitutional order, the fre-
quency of changes or attempted changes, and the different levels of 
violence connected with the political procedures in each country. 
Thus, orderly and regular changes of government, through a non-violent 
electoral process, would be considered an indication of stability, 
while politically-motivated riots or demonstrations, particularly 
· those directed against the regime's authority, would, for example, be 
1Karl W. Deutsch, 11 Social Mobilization and Political Development," 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, no. 3, (September, 
1961) , p. 493. 
2Ibid. 
3 
considered evidence of instability. 
·, 
As for methodology, selected economic and non-ecc:momic indicators 
will be used to identify and measure. the process of social mobilization, 
and statistical tests will be applied to the data to determine its 
significance. Sin.ce the definition of social mobilization strongly 
implies a dimension of dynamism, the study wili be concerned not only 
with the degree of social mobilization achieved by the countries, but 
also with the rate at which it was achieved. The study, therefore, 
will cover a specific period of time, with the indicators gathered on 
a year-to-year basis to permit the charting of progress or r(;lgression. 
To measure the degree.of stability or instability present in each of 
the countries, political data will be extracted from actual political 
events occurring in the nations over a comparable period of time. One 
objective of the study is to arrive at a ranking of the countries 
based on both social. mobilization and political stability. The former. 
will be determined from the relative position of the indicators of 
social mobilization based on comparable statistics. The latter will be 
obtained by encapsulating the political data into an index of stability, 
which may then be used to rank the countries horizontally. Presented, 
therefore, with data relating to so9ial mobilization on the one hand, 
and political stability on the other, it should be possible to corre-
late the two phenomena in such a way as to demonstrate the relationship. 
Need for the Study 
The use of statistics in cross-national research naturally had to 
·await the,~tandardization of national bookkeeping and census-taking 
4 
procedures. Surprisingly, substantive efforts to this end were ini-
tiated as early as 1887, when the International Statistical Institute 
was founded. The institute prepared the groundwork for the systematic 
efforts of comparison and standardization later taken up at the govern-
mental level by the League of Nations, the International Labor Office, 
3 
and the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The wealth of 
data compiled, however, did not find its way into the social sciences 
until after World War II. It was at that time, according to Gabriel A. 
Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., that there developed 11 a trend toward 
intellectual innovation, efforts to master the new complexities, and an 
attempt to create a new intellectual order" in the discipline of com-
4 
parative government. In brief, these efforts at innovation included a 
search for theoretical order. Three developments were listed as being 
primarily responsible for this reassessment of goals and strategies: 
1. The national explosion in the Middle East, Africa and 
Asia; the emergence into statehood of a mul.tiple of nations 
with a bewildering variety of cultures, social institutions, 
and political characteristics; 
2. The loss of dominance of the nations of the Atlantic 
community; the diffusion of international power and 
influence into the former colonial and semi-colonial areas; 
3. The emergence of Communism as a powerful competitor in 
the struggle to shape the structure of national politics 
and of the international political system.5 
3Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations, 
(New Haven, Connecticut, 1966), p. 10. 
4Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative 
Politics, (Boston, 1966), P• 6. 
5Ibid., P• 5. 
5 
These developments, which clearly demonstrated the rapidly-
changing nature of .the interna.tional community in the post-World War II 
era, produced a flurry of activity within the social sciences. Econo-
mists became concerned with precise analyses of rates and patterns of 
growth. Sociologists became concerned with comparative measures of 
processes and structural change. And st1,1dents of politics, previously 
absorbed with single systems, became concerned with'schem~s of compari-
.. / 
son and tried t'o devise ways of testing their hypotheses quantitatively. 
These activities, in turn, led to the decisive breakthrough in quanti-
6 
tative research in the 1950s. The focal point for the subsequent re-
search and the new methodologies it spawned was the underdeveloped 
world. 
W.W. Rostow was among the first to suggest different stages of 
7 economic growth. By defining economic growth and development as a 
continuous, on-going, and goal-oriented process, he helped pave the way 
for further studies focusing on the period of transition from one stage 
' 
to another. Of particular significance was his concept of .the 11 take-
off, 11 an interval of only two or three decades in which the economy and 
the society undergo· a radical transformation leading to 11 automatic" 
8 
growth. Taking the cue from.Rostow, Bert F. Hoselitz saw economic 
growth as a 11 ••• process which affects not only purely economic re lat ions 
PMerritt and Rokkan, P• 11. 
7 
. W. W. Rostow, 11The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth, 11 The 
. Economic Journal, Vol. 66, (March, 1956), pp. 25-48. 
8Ibid., P• 25. 
6 
but the entire social·, political, and cultural fabric of a society.119 
This viewpoint, if not revolutionary, was a major contribution to a 
growing body of evidence .whi.ch urged the addition of a new and behav-
ioral dimension to the study of developing nations. A step in this 
direction already had been taken by George A. Theodorsen, who asserted 
that the industrialization of 11 nonmachine 11 societies eventually would 
· 10 
lead to the development of 11 new societal patterns. 11 In time, he 
maintained, these new patterns would resemble certain dominant patterns 
of Western industrialized society, including the creation of new roles, 
new skills, and new elites. Neil J. Smelser, who analyzed the relation-
ships between economic growth and the social structure; added to the 
literature by isolating four functional processes which he said have 
ramifications throughout society. These are: ( 1) In the realm of 
technology, the change from simple and traditionalized techniques to-
ward the application of scientific knowledge. (2) In agriculture, the 
evolution from subsistence farming toward commercial production of ag-
ricultural goods. (3) In industry, the transition from the use of hu-
man and animal power toward industrialization. (4) In ecological ar-
rangements, the movement from the farm and village toward urban 
11 
centers. 
9Bert F. Hoselitz, "Economic Growth and Development: Noneconomic 
Factors in Economic ·nevelopment,11 The American Economic Review, Vol. 
47, no. 2, '(May, 1957},. p. 36. 
lOGeorge A. Theodorsen, "Acceptance of Industrialization and Its 
Attendant·Consequences for the Social Patterns of Non-Western Socie-
ties," The American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, no. 5, (October, 
1953), p--:-z+n.·· 
11Neil J. Smelser, 11 Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," 
Political Development and Social Change, eds., Jason L. Finkle and 
Richard W. Gable, (New York, 1966), pp. 28-29. 
7 
Additional studies concentrated on defining those social and cul-
tural features associated with the evolutionary process of development. 
Such criteria were used by Manning Nash, for instance, in his design of 
a diagnostic scheme for the study of developing areas based upon social 
stratification, tae value system, the economic subsystem, and the poli-
12 
tical subsystem. Nash dealt with the essence of politics: His study 
centered on the choice to institute changes, the bringing together of 
means and facilities to implement the choice, and the organization of 
social and cultural life. 13 
In generalizing about societies moving from one stage of economic 
development to another, it is reasonable to say that the political 
systems in such societies tend. to assume new tasks and responsibilities. 
For example, frequently accompanying economic development are greater 
expenditures in the areas of health, education and welfare. The shift 
from a barter system to a mon~y economy may produce more emphasis upon 
interventional measures designed to prevent inflation or deflation. If 
trust in the officialdom happens to correspond with increased wages and 
salaries, banking systems may emerge to encourage savings and lead to 
the accumulation of private capital. In short, both the economic and 
political systems become complex. Inasmuch as increasing complexity 
stimulates the organizing of political parties and special interest 
groups, the systems eventually tend to become more decentralized as 
political power and economic power are dispersed among an ever-
12Manning Nash, 11 Some Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic 
Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 7, no. 2, 
(January, 1959), pp. 145-146. 
13Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
8 
widening plura1ity of individuals and organizations.14 At the same 
:time, however, powers may evolve or be created at the cente·r as govern-
. . .· 
ments take on n~w duties in the trartsitiona·lst~ge between ttaqitional 
and .modern societies. A key factor in the functional analysis .of power 
dispersion and power realignment is. the. concept: of political develop .. 
ment.· 
In its. most general form, political development n_iay be defiJl.ed as 
'-
. . . ~ . . 
11 ••• a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity 
to sustain successfull:y: and continuously new types of pemands and goals 
and the creation of new types of organizations. 1115 F~nctfonally; poli-
tical devel,opmerit. may take marty forms, no few~r than 10 of which are· 
: . . . . '. 
. 16 
:identified and discu.ssed by Lucian w. Pye. · Of gl;:'eatest. stg.nifi.cance 
' . . , . . ' 
to this study is Pye'sview of political development as mobilization 
and power: 
When political development is conceived of i,n .terllls of 
mobilization and an increase in the absolute level of 
power in the society,it becomes possible to distinguish 
both a purpose fo·r development and also a wide range . 
of, characteristics associated with 9eve lopment. Mariy 
of these characteristi~s, in turn,. can be measured, .· 
and hence, it is. possible to consttuct indices ·of · 
deve lopmeri't;:. 17 · 
14J. J. Spengle·r, "Economic Develop~ent:'. Political Preconditions 
and Political Consequences, 11 Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, no. ·3, -·-..,.,.---
(August, i.960), pp. 415~416. 
15 I ·. · . . 
Alfred Diamant; 11 The Nature of Politi.cal Development," Politi-
cal .Development and Social Change, eds., Jasqn L.· Fin)de and Richard 
W. Gable, p. 92~-
16 
Lucian W. Pye, 11The Concept .of Political Development," Political 
Development and Social Change, eds.~ Jason L.·. Finkle and Ri.chard W. 
Gab le, pp. '83-91. . . 
17Ibid., p. 89. 
9 
A number of political scientists have addressed themselves to the 
theoretical and practical applications of the formula set down in the 
above quotations. This study, in part, is itself concerned with the 
construction of indices of development and the measurement of the range 
of characteristics associated with development. In anticipation of re-
search using statistical indicators .of development, Deutsch proposed a 
broad range of social and economic indices for the construction of what 
18 
. he termed ''national profiles. 11 Also, Gabriel Almond and James S. 
Coleman have compared nations according to their relative "modernity" 
by using such indicators as urbanization, literacy, per capita income 
(and per capita gross national product), geographical and social mo-
bility, industrialization, connnunications, and participation by members 
19 
of the society in modern social and economic processes. A rigorous 
analysis of these factors enabled the authors to support their working 
hypothesis that economic development could be positively correlated 
20 
with political competitiveness. Equally significant was the study 
conducted by Seymour Martin Lipset, who used various indices of develop-
ment--wealth, industrialization, and urbanization--to support his hy-
pothesis that democracy is related to the state of economic develop-
21 
ment. In each case, Lipset discovered, the average wealth, degree of 
18Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward and Inventory of Basic Trends and Pat-
terns in Comparative and International Politics," The American Poli-
tical Science Review, Vol. 54, no. 1, (March, 1960)~p. 34-57. 
19cabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the 
Developing Areas, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1960)~. 532. ~ ~-
20 
Ibid., p. 538. 
21 
Seymour Martin Lip set,, Political Man, (New York, 1960), pp. 31-32. 
10 
industrialization, and level in education was much higher for the more 
22 
democratic countries. Lipset further concluded that 11 ~ •• all the 
various aspects of economic development--industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, wealth and education--are so closely related as to form one major 
23 
factor which has the political correlate of democracy." These find-
ings were in strong support of conclusions drawn in an earlier study by 
24 
Dani~l Lerner. Working with the Bureau of Applied Social Research, 
Lerner found a close connection between urbanization, literacy, voting 
rates, media consumption and production, and education. Simple and 
multiple.correlations between the four basic variables, based on United 
25 












Lerner's findings prompted him to observe that the evolution of a 
participant society involved a regular sequence of three phases: First 
comes urbanization; next comes literacy, which helps develop media, 
which in turn spreads more literacy, and finally comes the mass produc-
tion of all forms of media, made possible by advancements in technology. 
11 0ut of this interaction," Lerner reported, "develop those institutions 
22Ibid., P• 32. 
23 Ibid., p. 41. 
24oaniel Lerner, The Passi!!S of the Traditional Society, (Glencoe, 
New York, 1958), PP• 54-65. 
25 
Ibid., P• 62. 
of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced societ-
i 1126 es. 
By using a more numerous and more diversified set of indicators, 
Deutsch sought to. bring together the broad range of characteristics 
11 
associated .. with economic development into a single process called social 
mobilization. Drawing on the research of Lerner and Lipset, Deutsch 
postulated a high degree of correlation among the various indicators, 
and suggested that a significant upward thrust by any one of the selec-
ted indicators would have a corresponding effect on the others. To use 
his terminology, each indicator would have a "threshold of criticality," 
at which point significant changes, or side effects, in other political 
27 
and social processes would appear. This is consistent with and re-
lated to Lerner's thesis that urbanization stimulates literacy; the two 
in concert help produce participation in the media_, and the interaction 
of the three lead to greater political participation, as reflected in 
such indicators as voting rates. Thus Deutsch sets forth the proposi-
tion that social mobilization is significant for politics, and that the 
processes involved in social mobilization may act, in their cumulative 
effects, to transform political behavior. In illustrating the possi-
bility of applying his model, Deutsch compiled partial data for 19 
countries. 
The foregoing research points clearly in the direction taken by 
this study. It has been shown, by a selective review of the literature, 
that e.conomic development tends to follow a pattern of growth in stages. 
26 
Ibid., P• 60. 
27 
Deutsch, 11 Social Mobilization and Political Development," p. 497. 
12 
It has been shown that economic development appears to effect direct 
changes in the social, political, and cultural life of a country. With 
a range of both economic and non-economic characteristics associated 
with the overall process of development, it becomes possible to devise 
a number of indices of development. These indicators, in turn, may be 
measured statistically from one period of time to another. Finally, 
Deutsch's study proposes an analytical scheme demonstrating that the 
entire process of development, i.e., social mobilization, may- be sub-
jected to quantitative examination. The indicators suggested by 
Deutsch for quantification include gross national product per capita, 
population, percent of radio audience, percent of newspaper readers, 
percent of literates, percent of work force in non-agricultural occupa-
, d f b 1 . 28 t1ons, an percent o ur an popu ation. 
This study proposes to apply Deutsch's model, in its general out-
lines, to the 10 nations named above. The questions guiding the re-
search are these: Can the process of social mobilization be measured? 
If so, what are the effects of social mobilization on the peoples and 
institutions of countries undergoing the process? The first question 
may be approached by subjecting the selected nations to a searching 
analysis based on the Deutsch model. The conclusions of this examina-
tion will rest upon whatever patterns evolve in each of the 10 
countries. The second questionmay be approached from a comparison of 
the degree of social mobilization in each of the countries with the 
relative stability of each of the countries. In its totality, the 
study is expected to yield generalizations relating to the consequences 
28 
Ibid., p. 504. 
13 
of stagnation as well as rapid development. At best, correlations so 
convincing as to indicate probable causal relationships will result. At 
the other extreme, the model may prove insufficient for the purposes 
for which it was designed. 
Theoretical Framework 
In essence, this study shall be conducted along two lines of 
analysis: The first shall seek to determine the degree and rate of 
social mobilization in each of the 10 countries, as determined by the 
position of the indicators and their average annual rate of increase or 
decrease. The second line of analysis shall consist of a comparison of 
social mobilization with the political correlate of stability. 
For purposes of refinement, the Deutsch notion of the two "thresh-
olds" will be employed. 29 The first of these is the "threshold of sig-
nificance," which postulates that a significant movement in the level 
of any one of the indicators will result in a significant movement by 
the other indicators. Conversely, this notion holds that there is a 
numerical value below which no significant departure from the customary 
workings of the society can be detected. For example, the threshold of 
significance for the indicator of literacy might be 50 percent. Until 
that level is reached, no significant movements in the other indicators 
would be detected, indicating that the process of social mobilization 
in that country has either not yet.begun or is at a low stage. Once 
.the 50 percent level is reached, however, jumps in such indicators as 
newspaper circulation, urbanization, and percentage of the work force 
29 Ibid., P• 497. 
14 
in non-agricultural occupations might occur. To this study, the value 
of the threshold of significance--if such may be detected--may lie in 
its ability to help the researcher analyze the social mobilization pro-
cess on a dynamic, year-to-year basis. The second threshold is the 
"threshold of criticality, 11 which posits changes in social or political 
side effects when each of the indicators has reached a certain "criti-
cal" level. To merely speculate for purposes of offering an e~ample, 
one threshold of criticality, insofar as stability is concerned, may 
lie at a figure of $200 in the indicator of gross national product per 
capita. At this point, certain characteristics of instability, such as 
riots or demonstrations, might appear. Another threshold of criticality 
may be a gross national product per capita of $1,000, at which point 
those elements of instability may begin to disappear. It is doubtful 
that such clearly-drawn lines may be detected, but the use of this 
threshold may aid in the interpretation of the impact of rapid develop-
ment upon the stability of a nation. 
To summarize, the theoretical framework of this study may be 
stated as follows: 
1. Social mobilization is viewed as the process through which 
significant parts of the population are introduced to new patterns and 
functions as a country undergoes social, economic, and political <level-
opment. 
2. Such development may be measured by breaking it down into the 
component parts of various types of demographic changes, geographical 
and occupational mobility, literacy, communications, and economic 
progress or regression. 
15 
3. As statistics for each of these processes are compiled and in-
terpreted on a year-to-year basis, it is possible to determine the 
degree and rate of social mobilization by computing the changes in each 
of the selected indicators. 
4. Based on the degree of social mobilization and the rate of 
social mobilization, the nations can be ranked in relation to one 
another for comparative purposes. 
S. These countries may then be compared with one another on the 
basis of stability, as determined by the political histories of each of 
the countries, to arrive at separate rankings. 
6.· At this point, the different rankings may be correlated in such 
a manner as to determine the relationships, if any, between social 
mobilization and political stability. 
7. To aid in the interpretation and analysis of statistics relat-
ing to the process of social mobilization, and political data relating 
to stability, levels of significance and criticality may be investigated 
in accordance with t~e thresholds of significance and criticality. 
Hypotheses 
The major hypbthesis for this study is that the rate and degree of 
social mobilization do have significance for the political process. It 
is anticipated that the research in this study will indicate that those 
countries ranking high in social mobilization will differ, in their 
political essentials, from those countries ranking low in terms of 
social mobilization. This difference, it is expected, will be discern-
ible from a study of the political stability of each of the countries. 
Connected with this major hypothesis are three corollary hypotheses: 
16 
L A certain. amount of stability in the government or in the con-
stitutional order is necessary before rapid social mobilization may 
take place. Without such stability, it. is submitted~ a country will be 
unable to embark upon the programs and processes necessary to mobilize 
its population to any significant degree. 
2. In the short run, rapid social mobilization will place s.tres-
ses and strains upon the political process which will be made manifest 
by indications of rec1,1rrent violence or instability. In other words, 
the social mobilization process will place demands on the systems which 
may be too great to be fulfilled, thus upsetting the political equilib-
rium. 
3. In the long run, the social mobilization process will become 
institutionalized to such a degree that rapid social and economic de-
velopment may continue without straining the political process. Under 
this situation, a country's political system would be so highly devel-
oped as to absorb the additional demands placed upon it by a population 
experiencing social mobilization without upsetting the political 
equilibrium. 
Methodology 
Selection and Use of Indicators 
Indicators used in this study are workable from the standpoints of 
both availability and economy: They are, for the most part, readily 
available;· and, though few in number, they combine and illuminate those 
factors which make it possible to identify and measure the process of 
social mobilization. Previous studies based on similar data have 
17 
demonstrated their usefulness in yielding generalizations concerning 
economic development and social and political factors. For example, 
Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris conducted a factor analysis of per 
capita gross national product and a large number of social and political 
variables for the period from 1957 to 1962. The results of their 
analysis showed 11 ••• that a remarkably high percentage of inter-
country variations in the levels of economic development ••• are asso-
. , 30 
ciated with differences in non-economic character1st1cs. 11 In another 
study, Edward G. Stockwell found a high correlation between economic 
development, based on per capita income, and such demographic variables 
31 
as death rate, birth rate, and infant mortality. All of the indica-
tors used in this study were adopted from the Deutsch model, with the 
exception of birth rate. It was substituted in favor of raw population 
figures in order to further refine the social and demographic aspects 
of the social mobilization index. 
The birth rate indicator is intended to measure the propensity of 
the population to increase or decrease in relation to other factors of 
development. In many underdeveloped countries with high birth rates, 
according to c. E. Black, "the growth in population may outstrip by a 
considerable margin any possible expansion in the output of food and 
32 
manufactured goods." Thus, per capita gross national product may 
30rrma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, 11 A Factor Analysis of the 
Interrelationships Between Social and Political Variables and Per Capita 
Gross National Product," The Quarterl_y Journal of ~conomics, Vol. 79, 
no. 4, (November, 1965), p. 556, 
31 
Edward G. Stockwell, 11 The Measurement of Economic Development," 
Economic Development, Vol. 8, no. 4, part 1, (July, 1960), pp.419-432. 
32c. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, (New York, 1966), 
p. 30. 
18 
decline even under conditions of growth in agriculture or industry. 
Also, this indicator may be helpful in reflecting traditional values 
and behavioral patterns of the peoples of countries which are reluctant 
33 
(or inclined) to adopt birth co.ntro 1 measures. By the same token, an 
analysis of this indicator in relation to other indicators may disclose 
that a country is unable to employ birth control measures because of 
poor medical practices, poor connnunications, or poor transportation 
facilities. The United Nations Demographic Yearbook contains statis-
tics on the crude birth rate per 1,000 of population on a year-to-year 
basis. 
The second indicator used in this study is the percentage of the 
work force engaged in non-agricultural occupations. This indicator may 
be used to measure the ability or inclination of the inhabitants of a 
country to move from ascribed occupations (those resulting from circum-
stances of birth) to achieved occupations (those based on acquired 
skills or achievement). The indicator may also be used to approximate 
the extent of mechanization in agriculture, as determined by the percen..: 
tage of population necessary to produce food for the country as a 
whole. Finally, the indicator provides some insight into the indus-
trialization of a country, as determined by the number of jobs available 
outside the agricultural sector. Statistics disclosing the percentage 
of the work force engaged in agricultural occupations are found in the 
Production Yearbook of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organi-
zation. To determine the percentage of work force engaged in non-




The third indicator used in this study is the percentage of popula-
tion in the urban areas. In general, this indicator tends to reinforce 
the one described in the.above paragraph, and may be used as an aid to 
the understanding and interpretation of the same processes. At the 
same ti~e, however, this indicator measures another unique but vital 
phenomenon: The attraction of 'the city to the rural dweller. Urbani-
zation, as previously demonstrated by the Lipset and Lerner studies, is 
a dominant feature in the transition from a traditional to a modern 
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society. Though statistics relating to urbanization on a year-to-
year basis are extremely scarce, Bruce M. Russett provides a figure for 
one year, along with the indicator's average annual increase, in his 
World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators. From these two fig-
ures, a reasonably accurate estimation of urbanization in a country for 
any given year in the past two decades may be computed. For purposes 
of comparison, Russett defines an urban area as one having a population 
of at least 20,000 persons. 
The fourth indicator used in this study is literacy, based on the 
percentage of literate population aged 15 and over. This indicator is 
intended to measure both the availability of education and t.he connnit-
ment of the population and government to the attainment of minimal edu-
cational standards. Literacy also is important in seeking to determine 
the extent to which the mass media may be spread throughout the popula-
tion, and thus the degree to which the printed mass media may be used 
to stimulate the mobilizational process. The age of 15 is used to 
34see page 10. 
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include the adult population, and exclude, for the time being, those 
children who may drop out of the elementary school at an early age and 
lose, through disuse, their ability to read and write. Statistics for 
this indicator are found in the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. 
The fifth and sixth indicators used in this study are the number 
of radio receiving sets per 1,000 persons and the number of daily news-
paper copies circulated per 1,000 persons. The size of the communica-
tions network not only reflects the economic development of the 
society--for a relatively high level of technology is necessary to pro~ 
duce and sustain a mass media--but also the involvement of the society 
in its environment, since a mass media may not survive without a ready 
market for inforrnation. These indicators may be measured not only in 
raw numbers, through statistics printed in the UNESCO Statistical Year-
Book, but also in terms of audience participation. Using techniques 
devised by Deutsch for the social mobilization model, one may arrive at 
the percentage of population exposed to radio broadcasting by multiply-
ing the number of radio sets per 100 persons by a factor of four, and. 
the percentage of population exposed to daily newspapers by multiplying 
the number of newspaper copies circulated per 100 persons by a factor 
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of three. Assuming each radio set reaches an audience of four persons 
and each newspaper reaches three readers, broadcasting saturation is 
attained at a ratio of 25 radios for every 100 persons, and maximum 
newspaper readership (among the literate population) is attained at a 
ratio of 33 newspaper copies for every 100 persons. 
35oeutsch, "Social Mobilization and Poli ti cal Development, 11 p. 511. 
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The seventh and final indicator used in this study is gross 
national product per capita. As an indicator of economic development, 
this variable has found general acceptance among persons widely credit-
ed with having expertise in the field, including Deutsch, Almond, 
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Coleman, and Russett. This indicator has particular significance for 
the sociat mobilization process in that it compensates for population 
increase or decrease in relation to the growth or decline in agricul-
ture and industry. Figures used in this study will be taken from data 
compiled by the Agency for International Development, and will be cor-
rected to. the value of the 1965 United States dollar. 
Selection of Countries 
Thr,ee essential requirements should be met by any group of 
countries selected for use in this study: First, complete or near-
complete data should be available for each of them. Second, the nations 
selected should represent a broad range of economic development to 
determine whether a model based on social mobilization would have uni-
versal applicability. Third, the nations should be well-scattered 
geographically? in order that different cultures, historical back-
grounds, and religious values might be included. The group of 
countries selected for this study--Argentina, Canada, Israel, Italy, 
Mexico, Japan, Spain, The Philippines, India, and Turkey--meet each of 
these requirements. 
36 
Bruce M. Russett, World Handbook of Political and Social Indi-
cators, (New Haven, Connecticut, 1964), 'µ:" 149, and previously cited 
studies. 
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Determination of Social Mobilization 
The time period covered by this study includes the years 1950 
through 1965, a total of 16 years. This provides a period short enough 
to be manageable, yet long enough, in the researcher's judgment, to 
reflect fully-established trends. It also permits the inclusion of 
three nations which gained independence in the post-World War II era--. 
The Philippines, India, and Israel--and three nations which suffered 
physical damage during the war: The Philippines, Japan, and Italy. 
Furthermore, the period covers the post-war boom which provides an 
excellent laboratory for the study of economic development. More so 
than in virtually any other period of time, the indicators of social. 
mobilization should have experienced significant movements. 
Statistics for each of the indicators used in this study will be 
gathered for each of the years in the period covered by the study, thus 
permitting a comparison of the relative degree of social and economic· 
development in each of the countries from 1950 through 196.5. Based on 
the data for 1950 and 1965, an average annual increase or decrease for 
each of the indicators may be computed. This will reveal the rate of 
progress or regression for each of the indicators, and, when considered 
as a whole, the rate of social mobilization for each of the countries. 
To compensate for the relative positions of the countries in the period 
prior to the base year of this study, the degree of development must be 
considered along with the rate of development. Charts based on social 
mobilization would show, therefore, the degree of social and economic 
development in 1965, the degree of social and economic development as 
of 1950, and the average annual increase, in plus or minus terms, for 
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each of the indicators. This chart will depict all 10 nations ranked 
in order of the degree of social mobilization in 1965. The average 
annual increase in the indicators will illustrate the rate, or speed, 
with which a nation might move from one stage of deve.lopment to another. 
Other charts will be prepared comparing all of the countries according 
to a single variable. These charts should yield information concerning 
the threshold of significance, or the point at which movements in some 
variables may tend to be accompanied or followed by movements in other 
variables. 
Determination of Stability 
Stability, while one of the most widely used concepts in political 
analysis, is at the same time one of the most difficult to precisely 
define and measure: If stability were to be defined as the maintenance 
of a particular system of government or constitutional order, then how 
should one interpret the peaceful adoption of a new constitution provid-
ing for new and different political institutions? On the other hand, 
if stability were to be defined as the continuance in power of a par-
ticular individual or party, then how should one interpret orderly, if 
frequent, elections? The difficult in determining the stability of a 
country by either of the definitions is demonstrated by the case of the 
Third French Republic. When viewed in accordance with the first defi-
nition, the country at that time would seem to have been stable; when 
judged by the second definition, it would be considered unstable. For 
such reasons, this study combines the two definitions and adds the 
concept of violence, considering stability to mean the ability of a 
government and/or constitutional order to maintain its authority with 
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a minimum of violence. 
Naturally, it is recognized that there are degrees of stability as 
well as instability. Any scale attempting to measure this variable, 
based on the given definition, should take into account the differing 
levels of violence within a normally stable government or constitutional 
order. Also, the scale should be able to approximate the point at which 
stability begins to break down. With these considerations in mind, it 
was decided to devise an index which would permit the measurement of 
stability in accordance with a broad range of political events. To 
enhance the validity of such an index, it was further decided that the 
criteria should be based upon actual political events taking place in 
the countries studied. To this end, the political histories of all 10 
nations were researched through the files of the New York Times Index. 
Information was gathered for the period from 1951 to 1966, advanced one 
year beyond the period used in the social mobilization index.to permit 
evaluation of the political events in light of the mobilization data. 
From such information, 27 criteria were obtained, ranging from the 
hypothetical case of no political activity, numbered zero, to the case 
of a government overthrown by a general uprising, numbered 26. Listed 
in ascending order from "peaceful stability" to "violent instability;' 
these criteria are: 
O. No cabinet resignations; no elections; government continues. 
1. Occasional resignations from cabinet; government ~emains 
unchanged. 
2. Cabinet is re-organized, but no elections are held. and govern-
mental leadership remains unchanged. 
3. Cabinet resigns, but executive leadership remains unchanged. 
New government formed without elections. 
4. Government resigns and incumbent party wins election under 
the old leadership. 
5. Government resigns and incumbent party wins elections under 
new leadership. 
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6. Government resigns and opposition wins election and forms new 
government or new coalition to govern. 
7. Political demonstrations held to oppose government or seek re-
dress from grievances. 
8. Political strikes held to oppose government or seek redress. 
9. Isolated rioting occurs in states or cities. 
10. Occasional rioting occurs in states or cities. 
11. Wide-spread rioting occurs over one-half or more of the 
geographical area. 
12. Plot to overthrow government verified and thwarted. 
13. Isolated terrorist activity occurs, including bombings, 
sabotage and/or attempted assassinations. 
14. Occasional terrorist activity occurs, including political 
murders and assassination. 
15. Wide-spread terrorist activity occurs. 
16. Central government assumes control of an internal area, under 
regular constitutional provisions. 
17. Government declares a 11 state of siege 11 or 11 state of emergency11 
without suspending the constitution. 
18. Constitution or any of its provisions, including elections 
and right of habeas corpus, is suspended. 
19. Martial law is imposed as an emergency measure to pacify 
internal areas. 
20. Martial law is imposed to preserve stability of the govern-
ment or constitutional order. 
21. Organized armed resistance occurs, with no attempt to over-
throw the government or constitutional order. 
22. Organized armed resistance occurs with intent to overthrow 
government or impose new constitutional order. 
23. Government survives an unsuccessful attempt at coup d'etat. 
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24. Government becomes threatened by rebellion and open civil war. 
25. Government overthrown by coup d'etat or palace revolution. 
26. Government overthrown by rebellion and open civil war. 
As can be seen, the first nine steps of this scale--from zero 
through number eight--indicate governmental stability without violence. 
The next 13 steps--from nine through 21--indicate different degrees of 
stability with violence. The last five steps of the scale--from 22 
through 26--indicate instability. Thus it may be shown that stability 
may be maintained through a rather broad range of violent activity, up 
to a point where the level of violence begins to constitute a threat to 
the governmental order. Certain acts which may be bloodless in them-
selves--such as the suspension of. the constitution or a neat coup d'etct, 
must be accorded a high place on the scale because of the violent 
wrenching of the political process. 
Based on this scale, a graph may be drawn to illustrate the levels 
of stability for each of the 10 nations for the period from 1951 
through 1966. These graphs may then be compared with the degree of 
social mobilization and the rate of social mobilization. From these 
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comparisons,, generalizations regarding the re latio~ship h~tween the two 
factors may be iriterpolated. 
The neoct chapter of this thesis shall consist of an overview of 
the data gathered on both soci.al mobilization and political stability, 
with partic;tilar empha~is on the interrelationship among the variables 
of social mobilization. In Chapter III shall be presented the findings 
of the study as they relate to·the hypotheses, with individual countries 
discussed at length. The final .chapter shall consist of a discussion 
of the conclusions and implications of the research contained in this 
study. 
CHAPTER II 
OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
This chapter will deal with the determination and ranking of the 
countries according to the degree and rate of .social mobilization and 
the determination and ranking of the countries according to political 
stability. To introduce the findings, data relating to these topics 
will first be presented generally, with a more in-depth analysis to 
follow. 
Table I ranks the countries according to the degree of social 
mobilization based on statistics for the year 1965. It is structured 
in such a way as to show the degree of social mobilization in the year 
1950, and to report as well the percentage of average annual increase 
for each of the indicators. In terms of social mobilization, a decrease 
in the birth rate per 1,000 is counted as an increase, and therefore is 
scored as a 11 plusll instead of a 11minus. 11 The rankings were determined 
by the overall position of the indicators, with Canada, being highest 
in gross national product per capita, percentage of population in non-
agricultural occupations, and radio~ and second highest in literacy and 
newspaper copies per 1,000, ranking first. If all indicators other 
than gross national product per capita were equal or nearly equal, the 
ranking was determined by the higher figure for gross national product 
per capita, which, for example, places Italy ahead of Japan. On the 
lower end of the scale, Turkey had a higher gross national product per 
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TABLE I 
DEGREE AND RATE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 
Country GNP/CAP % % io Non-ag. News- % Newspaper Radios 
% Radio Birthrate and Rank $U.S. Literate Urban occupation papers Audience Audience 
I. Canada· 
1965 2451 99.7 40.5 91 227 68.1 536 100 21.4 
1950* 1810 97.0 37.1 . 79 287 86.1 370 100 27.1 
% AAI 2 .,36 .11 • 22 .80 -1.6 -1.2 2.9 - .38 
II. Israel-
1965 1325 85.4 62.9 88 143 42.9 288 100 25.8 
1950 591 93. 7 55.0 . 88 234 70.2 122 48.8 34. 7 
% AAI· 8.27 -.26 .39 - -4. 2 -1.82 9.0 3.6 .60 
III. Italy 
1965 1100 94.1 32.9 76 113 33.9 213 85~2 19.2 
1950 541 85.5 29.4 60 98 29.4 68 27.2 19.5 
% AAI 6.87 .51 • 23 1.6 1.0 .30 14.2 3:9 .02 
IV. Japan 
1965 863 99.9 50.1 73 .o 451 100 220 88.0 18.6 
1950 280 . 90.0 40.5 51 219 65.7 111 44.4 28.2 
% AAI 13 .2 .76 .64 1.5 7.0 2.3 6.4 2.9 .66 
v. Argentina 
1965 718 93 .9 52 82 148 44.4 309 100 21.5 
1950 591 86 .4 46.8 75 207 621 . 128 51.2 25.6 
% AAI 1.42 .50 .34 .46 -2.7 -1.2 9.4 3.3 .27 
....;. 
.... 
"Average annual increase. 
"' SOURCE: For information regarding the various sources, see AppendixA. '° 
TABLE I (Continued) 
Country GNP/CAP lo lo % Non-ag. News-
and Rank $U.S. Literate Urban occupation papers 
VI. Spain 
1965 688 90.4 46. 4 65.0 153 
1950 320 82.4 39.8 48.0 60 
% AAI 7.66 .73 • 44 1.2 10.3 
VII. Mexico 
1965 455 68.7 33.0 48 116 
1950 304 56.8 24.0 35 46 
% AAI 3.32 .65 .60 .87 7.2 
VIII. Philippines 
1965 161 84. 7 45 41 17 
1950 106 60.0 12.7 31 26 
% AAI 3.66 1.4 2.3 .70 -3.5 
IX. Turkey 
1965 261 43 .1 21.0 28.0 45 
1950 181 31.9 17.2 14.0 15 
10 AAI 2.95 .98 .26 .90 13 .3 
x. India 
1965 101 24.8 14.5 30.0 12 
1950 78 19.0 11.8 28.0 6 
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capita than The Philippines, but was considerably behind in the indica-
tors of literacy, urbanization, percentage of population in non-
agricultural occupations, and birth rate, which gives The Philippines 
the higher.position·. 
As can be seen from the line marked "percentage of average annual 
increase," the rate of social mobilization is greatest for those 
countries in the middle portion of the scale. Canada, which had the 
highest degree of social mobilization in 1950, has an understandably low 
rate of social mobilization, since there was little room for improvement 
in most of the indicators. India, on the other hand, also had the low-
est degree of social mobilization in 1950. Its rate of social mobiliza-
tion, consequently, is also the lowest of the 10 countries. The highest 
rate of social mobilization belongs to Japan, followed by Israel, Italy, 
and Spain. The other countries have comparatively lower rates of social 
mobilization, though, in some indicators, the development is more rapid. 
The Philippines, for example, has the greatest average annual increase· 
in the percentage of literate population of al1 10 countries. Its in-
crease in the percentage of urban dwellers also is highest, but the 
other indicators have either decreased or increased slowly. 
Table II ranks the countries according to political stability and 
levels of violence. The rankings were determined by the peaks in the 
violence levels recorded over the 16-year period from 1951 to 1966. 
Graphs charting the violence levels and instability, based on the in-
stability index devised for this study, are included in Appendix B. 
The appenqix also includes a description of the year-to-year political 
events in each of the countries, highlighted by the occurrence which 


















Peacelul elections; ~ppo.sition 
party victories in 1957 and 
1963; terrorist act tn 1966. 
Terrorist activity from 1953 
through 1957; demoristrations 
until l963; inct,tmbent: party. 
victory in 1964~ · · 
Strikes and.isolated rioting 
· u.ntil 1959; . isolated terrorism. 
in 1961; ete~iioris in 1964.and 
· 1966. 
' . . . 
Wide-spread rioting in 1952, 
again in 1960 and 1961; plot to · 
overthrow. government.in 1962; 
demonstrations up to .19.66 .• 
Rebellion tn 1954; state goes 
under governmentai control in 
1961; plot revealed in 1966. 
Constituti6n iuspended in 1956 
and 1958; state of en:jergency 
decla;red. iri 1962. · 
Cont'inual fighting between B.uk 
guer.:i,llas and government troops; 
elections marred by shootings. 
War with Naga rebels; wide.-
spread riotipg and.t~rrorism; 
government l;1°$St1me$ control 1over 
areas. 
Coup d'etat in 1960; threats in 
1961, 1962,and 1963. 
Gove':rtiment over'thr&wn:. three . 
times in 16 years;. five co·up 
attempts fai 1. ·· · 
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countries, only Argentina and Turkey experienced instability, due, in 
both cases, to violent changes in the government. The other countries, 
while all are relatively stable, were ranked in accordance with the 
overall level of violence. 
Indicators of Social Mobilization 
It is suggested throughout this study that the process of social 
mobilization may be measured by the social and economic indicators of 
gross national product per capita, literacy, urbanization~ percentage 
. ' ' ·----·,·-,,~..... ·~··~-~---,,,,,__ '" ... "''"-----· ~-
of the work force in non-agricultural occupations, newspaper distribu-
tion, radio listeners, and birth rate. The use of such indicators rests 
upon the assumption that, as a nation becomes more highly developed 
economically, its citizenship has greater educational opportunity, ex-
cess farm population becomes siphoned off for attractive jobs in the 
cities, a greater market is created for the mass media, and birth rates 
tend to decrease. It cannot be assumed that the process occurs in pre-
cisely the same manner in countries all over the earth, or that the 
variables involved in the process will increase or decrease at the same 
rates in relation to one another. Some nations, for example, may place 
a premium on universal education, while others do not. The most that 
can be suggested is that these processes tend to go together in similar 
circumstances. To test this assumption, correlation coefficients for 
all the variables were computed. If the variables correlated at a 
reasonably high level, one could then be satisfied that they were 
measuring the same process, i.e., that of social mobiUzation. The 
results of the correlations, based upon statistics from the 10 
countries for the year 1965, are presented in Table III. 
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TABLE III 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION~ 1965 
Variable GNP/CAP Literacy Urban to Non-ag. News- Radios Births 
papers 
GNP/CAP .65 .34 • 86 .33 .97 -.57 
Literacy • 77 • 82 .62 .63 -.85 
Urban .66 .32 • 83 -.58 
% Non-ag. .so .89 -.82 
Newspapers .so -.54 
Radios -.51 
Births 
Of the 21 correlations in the matrix, 18 are above .50, 12 are 
above .60, seven are above .80, and one is above .90. While a sample 
of only 10 countries is perhaps too small to completely eliminate the 
element of chance, the correlations seem to demonstrate that the fac-
tors used herein to measure social mobilization are strongly associat-
ed. The negative correlations in the birth rate column result from the 
strong relationship between low birth rates and relatively high social 
and economic development. The variable which correlates most consis-
tently with the other factors of social mobilization is literacy. If 
this does not demonstrate that literacy is the most important variable 
in the measurement of social mobilization, it does indicate that this 
variable, more so than any other, tends to keep pace with the increases 
in the other six indicators. Of particular interest is the high 
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negative correlation between literacy and birth rates, which demon~ 
strates a probable relationship between high literacy and low birth 
rates, and vice versa. The correlation takes on added significance 
when, upon examining Table I, it is seen that no country with a literacy 
rate of more than 80 percent has a birth rate of more than 25 per 
thousand. Even The Philippines, which ranks comparatively low among 
all the other indicators of social mobilization, bears this out with a 
literacy rate of 84.7 percent and a birth rate of 24.6 per 1,000. It 
may therefore be concluded that, among the 10 countries in this study, 
a literacy rate of 80 percent has a threshold of criticality for the 
birth rate; that is, it is at the 80 percent level in the literacy 
column that a significant movement is observed in the birth rate 
column. 
Indicators which also correlate extremely well with the other 
factors of social mobilization, excepting newspaper distribution, are 
the percentage of work force in non-agricultural occupations and the 
number of radio sets per 1,000 persons. Thu,s these factors, too, have 
great significance for the social mobilization process. The relatively 
low correlations between newspaper circulation and the other factors of 
social mobilization appear surprising. One would assume, and previous 
l 
studies have indicated, that increasing social and economic develop-
ment is accompanied by increasingly higher newspaper circulation. 
Statistics gathered for this study indicate this is true only up to a 
1wi lbur Schramm and W. Lee Rugge ls, "How Mass Media Systems Grow," 
Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, eds., Daniel 
Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, (Honolulu, 1967), pp. 57-75. See also 
previously-cited studies by Lerner and Lipset. 
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· point of relatively high development, at which time the electronic media 
eventually begin to replace newspapers. Evidence for such a conclusion 
may be derived from the extremely high correlation between radio sets· 
and the other indicators of social mobilization, particularly between 
radio sets per 1,000 and gross national product per capita. The evi-
dence would be strengthened if the correlations between newspaper cir-
.culation and the other indicators of social mobilization were noticably 
higher for a group of less-developed nations. That such is the case may 
be seen from correlations between the same variables for the same 
countries based on statistics from the year 1950, when the nations were 
at correspondingly lower stages of development (Table IV). 
·TABLE IV 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, 1950 
Variable GNP/CAP Literacy Urban % Non-ag. 
GNP/CAP .60 • 43 .68 
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Table IV illustrates the strong correlation between newspapers and 
the other factors of social mobi.lization in the year 1950. Radfos, on 
the other hand, were less highly correlated with literacy, urbanization, 
and percentage of work force in non-agricultural occupations. The 
point may be further illustrated by referring to Appendix A which de-
picts the degree of s.ocial mobilization in all of the countries for 
each of the years- from 1950. through 1965 •. Four of the countries--
Canada, Israel, Argentina, and The,Philippines--show a net loss in 
newspaper circulation while registeririg overall gains in radio sets. 
Italy, in the four years during which it jumped in radio sets from 180 
per 1,000 to 213 per 1,000 dropped in newspaper circulation from 122 
per 1,000 to 113 per l,000. Mexico, while increasing radio sets per 
1,000 from· 184 to 206 in the year between 1964.and 1965, dropped in 
newspaper copies per 1,000 from 151 to 116 in the same year. In Turkey 
and. Spain, newspaper circulation has remained at an even keel in recent 
years while radios have contin4ed on the upswing. The only.exceptions 
~o this patternare·India, which is still striving to ·develop a mass 
media, and Japan, .which displays a voracious appetite for newspapers as 
well as ra'dios. Finally, it may. be seen that while radios correlate 
with gross national product per C<;lpita at the extremely high level of 
.97 for both the years 1965 and 1950, newspapers correlated with the 
same variable at a high .75 in 1950 and a low .33 in 1965. For the 
wealthier nations, it appears, radias are replacing newspapers as the 
source of information. Generally, newspaper circulation tends to de-
. . . 
crea~e when radio sets reach a .level of ar.ourtd 200 per 1,000, suggesting 
another threshold of criticality. 
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Overall, the correlations between the indicators of social mobili-
zation are somewhat higher for the year 1950 than for the year 1965. 
This s~ggests that the factors of social mobilization are more closely 
allied in the less-developed societies, and that they tend to become 
more divergent as the society becomes more mobilized. In other words, 
the mobilization process seems to be more pronounced in the countries 
at a lower stage of development. Urbanization, for example, is much 
more highly correlated with the other. indicators of social mobilization 
in 1950 than it is in 1965. This implies that urbanization had greater 
significance for social mobilization in the earlier years--that those 
who left the farm went to the cities; that the cities tended to produce 
a more literate population, and that the literates demanded information 
in greater quantities, thus spurring the growth of a mass media. Such 
a process was outlined, in fact, by the previously-cited Lerner and Lip-
set studies. Information gathered for this study suggests, however, a 
declining role for the cities in the mobilization process. It suggests 
that, as a society becomes more highly-developed, the beneficial effects 
of urbanization become more limited, and, at the same time, the rural 
areas begin to offer increased opportunities. The lower correlation in 
.1965 between the percentage of work force in non-agricultural occupa-
tions and urbanization indicates, for instance, that persons leaving 
the farm are finding employment in the smaller towns, and do not have 
to go to the city to find a job. Concurrently, the lower correlations 
in 1965 between urbanization and gross national product per capita, 
literacy, and birth rate suggests that the quality of the urban popu-
lations in the countries studied is decreasing rather than increasing. 
Such problems have not gone unnoticed. Tanti Shangri has voiced alarm 
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at the ever-increasing trend toward urbanization in India, 2 and Philip 
M. Hauser has outlined the social, economic and physical effects of 
the deteriorating urban conditions in developed as well as under-
. 3 
developed areas. . The coincidence in the conclusions of the two 
writers, and those in this study, is significant; particularly in light 
.of the fact that they were reached quite independently of one another. , 
Degree and Rate of Social Mobilization 
Other than newspaper circulation there are only two exceptions to. 
1:he overall pattern of increase among the social mobilization indicators 
for the 16-year period from 1950 through 1965. In Roman Catholic Spain, 
the birth rate per 1,000 went up from 20.2 in 1950 to 21.3 in 1965. 
While the increase in births is small, and it perhaps would be unwise 
to attribute too much influence to religion, it is interesting to note 
that in two other Catholic countries, Italy and Mexico, the birth rate 
remained essentially the same. Significant decreases in births are 
noted in The Philippines and Argentina, also largely-Catholic countries, 
but the influence of increased literacy in these countries is un-
deniably potent. The other. exception to the pattern of increase among 
the variables is in Israel, where literacy has decreased from 93.7 per-
cent to 85.4 percent over the 16 years. While other forces may be 
involved here, at least two factors are influential: One is the 
2 
Tan ti Shangri, 11Urbanization, Political Stability, and Eco:nomic 
G:i:-owth, 11 Political Development and Social Change,· eds., Finkle and 
Gable, pp. 305-319. 
3Philip M. Hauser, 11 The Social, Economic, and Technological Prob-
lems of Rapid Urbanization, 11 Industrialization and Society, eds., Bert 
F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, (New York, 1966), pp. 199-215. 
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large-scale irrnnigration into Israel of the so-called "Oriental Jews" 
from the more-traditional and less-literate societies in North Africa, 
and another is the growing Arab population within Israel. While 98 
percent of the Jewish children attend school regularly, only 90 percent 
4 
of the Arab children do so. 
As it is the nature of the indicators of social mobilization to 
increase--and generally in concert with one another--the 10 countries 
were in virtually the same position in relation to each other in 1950 
as they were in 1965. The outstanding exception would be Argentina, 
which in 1950 would have been ranked in third place ahead of both Italy 
and Japan. The reason for Argentina's comparatively low placement on 
the social mobilization scale in 1965 is obvious: hile it ranks high 
among the social and cultural indicators of social mobilization, its 
economy, as measured by gross national produce per capita, has grown, 
in fact, at a rate of only 1.42 percent per year in the years covered 
by this study. On several occasions during that period it actually 
decreased, most notic:eab1y from $670 in 1958 to $620 in 1959, and from 
$658 in 1960 to $635 in 1963. The latter decline so alarmed President 
Frondizi that he warned, in February, 1962, that if the negative growth 
rate were .maintained, Argentina would be overtaken and passed by Brazil 
5 
during the next two decades. The frustrations felt by the Argentines 
over their sluggish economy are no doubt exacerbated by the fact, 
beginning in about 1880, the country enjoyed 11 ••• a spectacularly rapid 
4 
The World Almanac, (New York, 1967), p. 630. 
5Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentina, (Englewood.Qliffs,,,New Jersey, 
1964), P• 3. 
economic and cultural development that placed it in the forefront of 
6 
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Latin America in everything but sheer size.H In recent times, however, 
Argentina has failed. to keep pace with the development of other nations 
around the globe. Its rate of social mobilization, consequently, is 
lower than that of any other country in this study except India. 
Japan, on the other hand, has skyrocketed in all phases of the 
social mobilization process. Though its social and cultural indicators 
were relatively high even in 1950, they continued to increase as Japan's 
gross national product per capita boomed at an amazing 13.2 percent per 
year. By any standard of measurement, Japan's rate of social mobiliza-
tion is highest among the 10 nations in this study, if not among the 
nations of the world. Even by 1965 Japan had passed the other nine 
nations in three indicators-•literacy, newspaper circulation per 1,000, 
and birth rate--and was gaining ground in the others. Eventually, 
Japan appears destined to pass Italy and Israel, though Canada, with 
its large gross national product per capita, may be out of its reach. 
In terms of the degree of social mobilization, Spain marks the 
point of division among the 10 countries; that is, significant differen-
ces may be noted in the indicators of social mobilization among those 
countries above Spain as compared with those countries be low Spain. If 
Spain is included in the upper group, it may be said that countries 
with a gross national product greater than $600 per capita also will 
be greater than 85 percent in literacy, 40 percent in urbanization, 
65 percent in non-agricultural work force, 40 percent in newspaper 
readership, 50 percent in radio audience, and will have a birth rate of 
6Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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less than 25 per 1,000. The converse, therefore, would be true for 
those countries below Spain. Though certain exceptions may be noted, 
such as urbanization, literacy, and birth rate in The Philippines, the 
tendency certainly exists. 
Political Stability Rankings 
It is considerably more difficult to differentiate among the 10 
countries in terms of political stability. Canada, with its history 
of peaceful elections, ranks as the most stable of the 10. nations, 
though an ominous note was struck in May, 1966, when a Quebec nation-
a list destroyed himself with a home-made bomb in the Parliament Build-
ing at Ottawa. The New York Times later reported he had intended to 
explode the device in the Commons Chamber, killing as many members of 
7 
Parliament as possible. The.. next three nations--Israel, Italy and 
Japan--are strikingly similar in their patterns of violence over the 
8 
16-year period from 1951 to 1966. Israel, which enjoyed relative 
tranquillity in domestic affairs. from 1958 to, 1966, was placed second; 
Italy, which experienced local terrorism in the province .of Balzano by 
Austrians to spur seccessionism among the German-speaking Tyrolese in 
1961, was placed third, and Japan, still troubled in 1966 by poHtical 
demonstrations, ranked fourth. Mexico, ranked fifth, reached a high-
water mark of violence in 1954, when federal troops were required to, 
put down a localized rebellion led by General Henriquez Guzman. Since 
7The New York Times, May 20; 1966. -----.-- '· 
8 
See Appendix B of this thesis for graphs and explanatory charts 
depicting the various levels of stability in each of the 10 countries. 
The reader should also keep in mind the 26-point stability index which 
contains the criteria upon which the rankings were based. 
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1954, however, Mexico's level of violence was somewhat lower than that 
of Spain, which was placed sixth. In seventh place was The Philippines, 
where the tenacious Huk guerrillas maintained constant pressure on gov-
ernment troops and where terrorism and political murder accompanied 
most national elections. India, reasonably stable at the center but 
continually harassed by instability in the states, was slotted eighth, 
while Turkey, overthrown by a coup d'etat in 1960, was ranked ninth. 
Argentina, where the government was overthrown three times in the 16-
year period, was placed tenth. 
It would appear as if only two of the countries--Argentina and 
Turkey--may be considered unstable, since these are the only nations 
which experienced violent changes in the governments. The definition 
of stability employed in this study, however, assumes an erosion of 
stability in direct proportion to the increase in the level of violence; 
in other words, as violence increases, stability decreases. It is 
recognized, of course, that a considerable gap may exist between a 
government with a high level of violence and a chronically unstable 
government like that of Argentina. This distance is represented on the 
stability charts in Appendix B by an "instability line" drawn at the 
point where a rebellion aimed at the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment occurs. Beneath the instability line, stable governments may be 
ranked according to their respective levels of violence. Those govern-
ments which manage to escape violence altogether would remain close to 
the base line of the graph, since violence does not re~lly begin until 
rioting starts to erupt. 
CHAPTER III 
DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES 
The primary hypothesis for this study holds that there is a sig-
nificant relationship between social mobilization and the political 
process, and it is submitted that this may be demonstrated through a 
comparison of the 10 nations based on social mobilization and political 
stability. Connected with the major proposition are three corollary 
hypotheses, maintaining that a certain amount of stability is necessary 
before rapid social mobilization may take place; that rapid social 
mobilization will, in the short run, place stresses and strains on the 
political system which will be made manifest by indications of insta-. 
bilit.y, and that, in the long run, the social mobilization process will 
become institutionalized and permit further mobilization, or develop-
ment, without unduly stra_ining the political process. 
In essence, the propositions are similar to those propounded by 
other political scientists in recent publications. In developing· a 
general theory of political integration, .Claude Ake conducted bis re-
search in reference to two related questions: What characteristics 
must.the political system possess to enable it to undertake social 
mobilization effectively? What type of political system is most cap-
able of .neutralizing the disruptive short-run eff~cts of social mobili-
zation? He rephrased the questions like this: How can a minimum of 
political stabiliiy be maintained in the face of the disruptive effects 
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of social mobilization? 1 In analyzing these questions, it may be seen 
that Ake is concerned with the same general problems outlined in this 
study. His first question is closely related to the first of the cor-
ollary hypotheses proposed in this study, and his second question is 
related to the third corollary hypothesis. Both questions, interest-
ingly, assume the validity of the second corollary hypothesis. Ake 1 s 
theory holds that "the political system undertaking social mobilization 
maximizes its capacity for carrying out the process and remaining stable 
despite the potentially disruptive short-run effects of social mobiliza-
tion if it is authoritarian, paternal, 1 identific,' and consensual." 
If any of these characteristics are absent, he adds, the destabilizing 
2 
effects of social mobilization are increased. An authoritarian system 
is defined by the author as one in which 11 the government's power is 
large, concentrated, and easily mobilized, and if the government mani-
fests a determination and ability to use this power to carry out its 
3 
policies ••• 11 A paternal system is one in which the political system 
is dominated by a political class that is willing and able to lead. 4 
An identific system is one in which there is a free flow of communica-
tions between the political class and the governed; the political formu-
la of the political class is acceptable to the governedf and the civic 
body considers that it has some interest in the continued existence of 
l Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, (Homewood, 
Illinois, 1967), p-; 98. 
2 
101. Ibid. , P• 
3Ibid., P• 102. 
4Ibid. , P• 106. 
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the government. 5 Finally, a consensual system is one in which the poli-
tical class is solidary and the hegemony of the political class is not 
6 
threatened by a counter-elite. 
Another social mobilization study focused on the Connnunist Party 
rather than political stability. Conducted by John W. Kautsky and 
Roger W. Benjamin, it contained these major points: In societies in 
which the.re is no modernizing or mobilizational movement, there is no 
Connnunist Party. As economic development proceeds, small groups of 
intellectuals form movements for further modernization. With further 
economic development,these groups begin to grow and attract support 
from workers and other groups. At this point, the groups begin to make 
demands upon the political system. To the extent the demands are not 
met, the groups become alienated and extremist. Finally, with still 
more economic development, these extremist groups are absorbed into the 
. 7 
political process and are no longer alienated. If it may be presumed 
that the activities of extremist groups such as the Connnunist Party 
lead to political instability, then the Kautsky and Benjamin thesis is 
closely related to the point of his study. For example, the short-run 
disruptive effects of social mobilization might be attributable to the 
rising demands and expectations of different groups, while the long-run 
institutionalization of the social mobilization process might reflect 
the absorption of such groups into the political process. 
5Ibid., p. 108. 
6Ibid., P• 111. 
7John W. Kautsky and Roger W. Benjamin, "Connnunism and Economic 
Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 
(March, 1968), pp. 110-111. 
47 
Relationship Between Mobilization and Stability 
If.there is to be any validity to the primary hypothesis that 
social.mobilization has significance. for the political process, as mani-
fested by political stability or instability, then there should be a 
strong correlation between those nations with a high degree of social 
mobilization and those nations with a high degree of political stabil~ 
ity and vice versa. That such is the case may be seen by Table V which 
ranks the 10 nations in this study according to social mobilization and 
political stability. 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY 




































Using the Spearman 1 s Rank Correlation Coefficient, the relationship 
between social mobilization and political stability among the 10 nations 
works out to .82, which lends statistical credence to the hypothesis. 
The correlation coefficient would be even higher were it not for the 
rather remarkable exception seen in the case of Argentina, which ranks 
fifth in social mobilization but tenth in political stability. 
The case of Argentina is worthy of comment, not only for the ele-
ment of dissonance it provides this study, but also because of its 
glaring failure to fit the standard models of economic and political 
development. With one of the greatest stores of social overhead capital 
in Latin America, it is expected that Argentina would be relatively 
immune from the destabilizing factors that plague its sister republics. 
As K. H. Silvert has written: 
Argentina will probably continue to serve as one of the 
more striking cases of resistance in the Romanic world to 
the value and institutional requirements of development. 
All Latin America offers case after case of differing . 
accommodations of traditional values to a certain ingestion 
of the modern, especially in the areas of industrialization 
and mimetic ideology. But Argentina's experience is still 
the most notable because of the country's extraordinary 
degree of urbanization, industrialization, and cultural 
Europeanization.B 
The roots of Argentina's instability, according to Silvert, lie in 
three inconsistencies, or paradoxes, which he sets forth in an effort 
to demonstrate that despite the country's.comparatively high level of 
development it is still in a pre-national condition. These are: 
1. There is a clash between the leveling effect of mass 
8K •. H. Silvert, 11 The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina, 11 
Expectarit Peoples, ed., K. H. Silvert, (New York, 1967), p. 372. The 
analysis in this study on the case of Argentina is taken primarily 
from this article. 
49 
communications and a very high degree of urbanization on the one hand, 
and on the other the failure of the political mechanism to escape the 
9 
corset of an extraordinarily narrow definition of interest. Silvert 
interprets this narrow definition of interest in terms of an inelastic 
pie analogy, in which a large slice for one particular group necessari-
ly means a smaller slice for everyone else. An example of this type of 
thinking, the author continues, was seen in the different positions of 
the lower classes in the Peron and post-Peron regimes. The former saw 
considerable improvement in the lot of the labor sector, which, to the 
Argentines, implied a built-in disadvantage to the upper classes, while 
the latter saw a return to power of the upper classes at the expense of 
labor. The opposing groups, Silvert maintains, never realistically con-
sidered which policy served the end of general development. 
2. There is a failure to adjust a fairly advanced degree of indus-
trialization to responsible entrepreneurial attitudes and to an appre-
ciation of the possibilities inherent in mass consumption. 10 Again, 
Silvert points out, the problem lies in the Argentines' inability to 
view their society as in some respects total and interdependent. 
Instead of promoting the development of healthy markets and thus genera-
ting economic growth, the power of industrialization is used to maintain 
a degree of social inequality. At the same time, however, industriali-
zation contributes to rising material expectations. And morale tends 
to deteriorate as these expectations are not fulfilled. 
91bid., p. 350. 
10 
Ibid., p. 351. 
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3. The third paradox lies in the individual. Though he is occu-
pationally highly-specialized--especially in the cities--he holds tra-
ditional values which do not permit him to be guided by a set of im-
personal loyalties toward all others operating within ·the system of 
11 
mutual dependency. This is reflected primarily in his failure to 
accept the state as the ultimate arbiter in secular disputes. Conse-
quently, social institutions are weakened, and this, in turn, invites 
autocratic personalism. 
These inconsistencies, assert the author, leave Argentina's gov-
ernment in an intrinsically weakened position. Debilities resulting 
not only from indifference toward the state as the ultimate arbiter, 
but also from political institutions subject to the crudest of pres-
sures from competing. groups, have imposed limitations upon Peron as 
... ~-
well as his succes·s·ors. Peron attempted to balance the competing in-
terest groups in ·,su-ch a. manner as t·o n~utralize their effectiveness in 
pressuring the country's simplistic political institutions. In times 
· of r~lative pro·sperity, he was able to succeed. With economic depres-
sion, however, brought on for the most part by the stagnation his 
policies produced·, his delicate balancing act was disrupted. The 
chronic military irttervention~sm which has characterized Argentine 
politics up to the present might be expected in a country.in which 
.direct sanctions by the police or military often have taken the place 
of legitimate political or judicial action. Thus, political stability 
in Argentina has suffered--primarily as a result of the traditional, 
long-entrenched culture wh:ich has developed over th,e years. In spite 
11 
Ibid., p. 352. 
51 
of a relatively advanced social and economic status, Argentina remains, 
) 
as Silvert asserts, essentially pre-national and non-integrated. 
The Case of India 
The first corollary hypothesis holds that a certain amount of sta-
bility is necessary before rapid social mobilization may take place. 
+he key factor in this analysis is the difference between social mobili-
zation per~ and rapid social mobilization. The data indicates that 
the process of social mobilization had already begun--and in most in-
stances was well under way--long before the base date of this study. 
In at least one nation, however, chronic political violence and sub-
federal instability appear to be associated with an inability to ini-
tiate rapid social mobilization. That nation is India. 
India is generally considered to be the epitome of the under-
developed society. Statistics gathered for this study disclose a gross 
national product per capita of about $100; a literacy rate of about 25 
percent; a work force still overwhelmingly agricultural; a rudimentary 
communications system, and a runaway birth rate of more than 38. per 
1,000. Yet it would be less·than accurate to imply that India has been 
completely by-passed by the process of social mobilization. Slowly, 
the gross national product has inched upward while the birth rate has 
been forced downward. Newspapers and radios have increased, albeit 
slightly, and a growing school system has added new millions to the 
educated sector of the population. Such development, however, can in 
no way be interpreted as 11 rapid. 11 Ever-recurring problems, further-
more, have added greatly to the bleakness of India's future. A brief 
list of these is given by Krishan Bhatia: 
••• India rs population has crossed the 500 mil lion mark and 
its annual rate of growth shows no sign of declining from 
2.4 percent; its economy is stagnating; its once ample re-
sources have been frittered away on grandiose schemes which 
have failed to pay the expected dividends, and its treasury 
is literally empty; it has experienced three successive 
years of drought, a phenomenon unparalleled in living· 
memory, and consequently has a food deficit this year con-
servatively estimated at twelve million tons ••• 12 
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It should not be necessary to belabor the point that the dimensions of 
underdevelopment in India are huge and multi-faceted. In the discussion 
of this corollary hypothesis, however, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that the rather obvious lack of rapid social mobilization in India is 
associated with the problem of political instability. In so doing, this 
discussion shall focus on the centrifugal forces straining the federal 
system; the failure of the Congress Party to mobilize a durable con sen-
sus; the chronic instability at the state level, and the general high 
level of political violence throughout the nation. 
Under the Indian federal system, the states are major arenas of 
political conflict and competition. The peculiar strain that this 
places on the dominant Congress Party--and ultimately upon the unity of 
India itself--is explained in the following passage: 
Nationally, it-Lthe Congress Partz/ bears the responsibility 
for nation-building. Yet the provincial branches of Congress 
are forced to contend in a very different environment, where 
they must embrace the particular local causes or perish •. Thus, 
in the 1957 elections, Congress found itself fighting Communists 
in Kera la, Benga 1 and And hr a; against communa 1 religious par-
ties in Punjab, Uttar and Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan; against 
tribal unions in Assam and Bihar; against ethno-linguistic 
fronts in Madras, Maharashtra, and Gujerat; against feudal-
prince r~storation parties in Orissa, Bihar, and Rajasthan; 
12Krishan Bhatia, "India Adrift," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 4, 
(July, 1967), p. 652. 
13 against the Praja Socialists in Bombay. 
In spite of the militant but scattered opposition, the 1957 general 
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elections did little to change the political complexion of India, either 
on the national or on the state. levels. But some of the results were 
unexpected and even startling. 14 Congress gained a few seats in the 
Lok Sabha, hut. lost 300 to 400 seats in the state legislative assem-
blies. In particular, losses were incurred in Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, 
Bombay, Bihar and West Bengal. 11 So effective were the coalition tac-
tics of the·opposition," writes Norman D. Palmer, 11 and so strong was 
the anti-Congress. fee ling on the linguistic issue, that six State mini-
sters and three Central ministers ••• were defeated in Maharashtra and 
Gujerat. 11 The Communist Party of India did so well--winning striking 
successes in Kerala, West Bengal and Bombay, and placing members in 
every state assembly--that it appeared to be the only party emerging 
from the election with confidence in its growing strength. One obser-
ver was moved to remark that if the elections had any lesson to offer, 
it was that the future of democracy in India was dark, because appre-
15 
ciation of its values was 11 lamentably lacking. 11 
If the 1957 elections were the harbinger of more difficult days to 
come, the more recent elections did even more to expose India's unity 
to stresses and strains. In more than half the states, the Congress 
13 Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, 
Issues of Political Development, (New Jersey, 1967), p. 42. 
14 . , 
Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System, (Boston, 1961), 
p. 229. The analysis in this study of the 1957 elections in India is 
excerpted from Palmer's discussion. 
15As quoted in Palmer, p. 231. 
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·Party was pushed qut of power while there was no sign that a more stable 
1 ' f ·1 ' 16 I f ' f h ' h a ternat1.ve pattern o power was evo. v1.ng. n 1.ve o t e e1.g t 
states that were lost, ministries we.re formed by coalitions of parties 
which have little in corIII!lon ideologica,ily and are held. together only 
by their desire for power. For example, the .two parties which shared 
contr.ol i~ Punjab represented mutuall_y".'antagonistic Hindu and Sikh 
. chauvinism. In West Bengal, the chief minister was a li.beral and a 
former member of Congress, while the deputy chief minister was a 
Peking-oriented Communist. 11 In order to maintain their precarious 
· unity, 11 asserts Bhatia, 11 these strange bedfellows may tend to face Con-
gress at the Center with more belligerence than is justified. 11 17 In 
the meantime, he adds, the government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi is unaccus-
tamed to sharing power with other p~litical parties and may not deal 
with the non-Congress states 11with the required degree of patience and 
18 
.understanding. 11 Already, notes the authority, there have been visi-
ble indications of the tendency of the central and state governments 
to move in opposite directions. In Kerala, to name one example, the 
state government is pressing for foreign exchange earned by exports 
from Kerala to be earmarked for the exclusive use of that state. "This 
may open a dangerous avenue of political thinking leading ultimately to 
secessionist moves," he warns. 19 






p. 653 • 
p. 654. 
55 
The Congress Party is more than merely a vehicle for electing can-
didates to office. It is a broad-based national movement which led the 
struggle for independence and has since assumed responsibility for 
India's future. As such, the lines of distinction between the Congress 
Party as a political party and the Congress Party as the government are 
hazy. Opposition to Congress, therefore, may be construed as opposi-
tion to the government. This, in turn, leads to obfuscation of the 
issues and a tendency to seek power as an end in itself, rather than as 
a means of governing more effectively. The problem is exacerbated in 
India by the lack of a viable opposition. Edward Shils, discussing the 
problem in theoretical terms as it applies to India as well as other 
states, puts it this way: 
While the Congress-like party is in the saddle, it impedes 
the emergence of an opposition responsive to the possibility 
of succeeding to power through tonstitutional means and made 
'respansive by that idea. Opposition is either discouraged 
by .the odds against which it must contend, or it is over-
whelmed by coercion. Thus, the leadership of opposition 
either withdraws from politics or gravitates toward the ex-
tremist party. Meanwhile, the dominant party, through long 
tenure in office, grows 'soft' and perhaps 'corrupt.' In 
any case, it is natural that people should get 'fed up' with 
it because, equally naturally, the party and its government 
cannot do all that public opinion requires of thetn. So, in 
,the course of time the party falls from power, and with its 
fall comes disintegration of the party. Therewith the unity 
of the nation is endangered and the op~ositional mentality 
comes once.more into active .influence. O 
Shils' comments are virtually echoed by Norman D. Palmeris observations 
on India: 
One of the ironies of the Indian political scene is that an 
effective opposition seems out of the question as long as 
Congress exists in its present forrri, while at the satne time 
the disintegration of the Congress might have adverse effects 
20Edward Shi ls, Political Development in the New States, (The 
Netherlands, 1962), p. 41. 
21 
on the entire prospects for democracy in India. 
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If an umbrella-type political party such as the Indian Congress is 
to survive, it must build a durable consensus and promote an identifica-
tion among the voting population with its aims and aspirations. Even if 
such a party were to claim the altruistic goal of tutoring its follow-
ers in the democratic process, preparatory to the establishment of a 
stab le multi-party system, it would need as its primary ingredient for 
success an increasingly larger and broadly-based attentive public that 
is concerned about public policy, reasonably well-informed, and willing 
to compete in the political arena. That neither a durable consensus 
nor a large attentive public has been developed is cause for further 
concern about the country's future. 
One indication of such a lack of consensus is provided in a study 
based partially on Indian voting habits by Joseph R. Gusfield. Citing 
statistics from a random sampling of Indian constituencies in the 1957 
and 1962 elections, Gusfield noted that approximately 75 percent of the 
seats in the State Assemblies changed as a result of the 1962 election. 
In 21 percent of all cases, he reported, an existing party retained a 
22 
seat but changed the seat holder. In the Lok Sabha, 65 percent of 
the seats changed, but in 29 percent of the elections the party remained 
23 
in power while the incumbent was replaced with another candidate. 
Concerning the Congress Party, Gusfield commented: 
21 Palmer, p. 195. 
22 Joseph R. Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in 
Modern India," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, no. 2, (Summer, 1965), p. 135. 
23 I b id • , p • 13 5 • 
The internecine conflicts of the Congress Party reveal them-
selves in the fact that in almost half the elections in which 
Congress retained control of a state assembly seat, a new le-
gislator had been substituted for the incumbent. Neither be-
tween parties nor within the Congress Party do we find the 
continuity and attachment which might be anticipated if voting 
for a specific party were a habit and if the party represented 
a degree of internal consistency and leadership at ihe local 
leve L It is far from unusual for a candidate to shift 
parties between the 1957 and 1962 elections. Thus the symbolic 
and co~crete role of party organization and unity as an aggre-
gator of interests is weak and uncertain in India.24 
As a result of the study, Gusfield was moved to remark that for many 
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Indian voters the party is by no means a symbol of group identification 
or affiliation. 11 Their rela.tion to politics is fleeting and unconnected 
to interests or to subsequent policy," he wrote. 11 They can be moved 
from leader to leader, from party to party. Although attachment is 
discoverable, it is by no means widespread or effective enough to pro-
25 vide great continuity in government. 11 
Another factor of instability reflecting a lack of consensus is a 
parliamentary tactic known in India as "crossing the floor." Occasion-
ally used in Western Parliaments to dramatize a stand on principle, 
floor-crossing is often employed in India to topple a state government 
or produce a precarious, razor-thin margin for the majority party. 
Besides having the obvious result of hamstringing an assembly, such 
defections are made even more attractive by the fact that a back-bench 
representative from the majority party may "cross the floor" to a.minis-
te.rial position in a coalition government. The use of party discipline 
to curb floor-crossing, such as denying the defector candidacy in,the 
next election, is ineffective, because, as Gusfield mentioned, it is 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
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not unusual for candidates to shift parties between elections anyway. 
The problem became so acute in 1967 that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, 
N. Sanjiva Reddy, focused national attention on it during a conference 
of presiding officers of the state legislatures: 11 If the growing menace 
of floor crossing in state legislatures is not checked in time," he 
warned, 11 it might result in administrative instabiHty, reduce the 
politics in the country to a farce, and thereby undermine the people's 
26 
faith in Democracy." 
In speaking of the "people," Reddy evidently was referring only to 
a small minority--a well~to-do elite which maintains an interest and 
knowledge of India's political affairs. For it is only such an educated 
minority, according to a study on political behavior in India, that is 
aware and informed on political issues and is able to think intelligent-
27 
ly about them. The illiterates--which according to this study repre-
sent about three-fourths of the Indian public--are a particular cause 
for concern since less than 10 percent of them in the urban areas ex-
pressed an interest in politics. 11 This is indeed significant," notes 
the author, 11 and dysfunctional to the development of political self-
28 
consciousness among the Indian people. In a survey of the total 
adult population on current political issues, the number of "'don 1 t 
know" responses was alarming. They ranged from 46 percent (urban) and 
65 percent (rural) on the question of whether a military dictatorship 
26 The Times of India, "Crossing of Floor Threat to Democracy," 
( Octobe-;-f5:-T967"5: ;;T 
27 
Samue 1 J. Eldersve ld, 11 The Poli ti cal Behavior of the Indian 
Public, 11 Politics in Transitional Societies, ed., Harvey G. Kebschull, 
(New York, 1968), p. 217. 
28 
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·in India would be good or bad, to 66 percent (urban) and 76 percent 
29 
(rural) on the questions about community development. 11 These general 
levels of political ignorance are high enough, 11 commented the author, 
11 to raise serious questions as to whether the political capacity of the 
Indian public, based on adequate knowledge, is in fact 'developing.'" 
He also wondered whether a government which in fact operates on the 
principle of democratic responsibility, and which also admits that it 
relies on public support for the implementation of its programs and 
plans, can function effectively in its present 11 style 11 of political and 
administrative strategy. 30 Linking the lack of knowledge and political 
interest with the problem of development, the author questioned whether 
"economic and social planning through India's democratic processes 
31 
really is reaching and motivating the great mass of the adult public. 11 
Finally, there is the problem in India of widespread political 
violence. Headlines tell the story in a review of newspapers over the 
period from 1951 to 1966: Border skirmishes, small Communist-led up-
risings, food and language riots, terrorism, guerilla warfare, and mass 
32 
arrests. Acts of disorder and sources of instability are reviewed in 
more specific terms in this brief r4ndown by Michael Brecher: 
The coming of six million refugees posed serious problems to 
the new government--as it did in neighboring Pakistan. Both 
Kerala in the south and Orissa in the east and Punjab in the 
north had to be placed under President's rule on various oc-
casions because of tension and deadlock in the political arena. 
Fasting has triggered off disorder frequently, notably in 
29Ibid., p. 215. 
30ibid., PP• 215-216. 
31 
Ibid., p. 217. 
32 The New York Times Index, 1951-1966. 
Andhra in 1952. Regional loyalties and linguistic passions 
have caused widespread violence and destruction, as in Bombay 
during the States' Reorganization period in 1956 and in Assam 
in 1960. Students are often in revolt against authority, ma-
jor strikes are not uncommon, and a Communist-led revolt in 
Hyderabad caused havoc and disorder from 1948 to 1950. The 
latest challenge to stability was the Sikh demand for a sepa-
rate state within India.33 
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Two of the more current sources of political vi.olence are the constant 
threat of a new outbreak of guerrilla war in Nagaland and the continuing 
agitation over language policy. Briefly stated, the issue in Nagaland 
is national independence versus India sovereignty. The Naga Federal 
Government, established by nationalists in 1956, maintains that when 
the British left India, Nagaland was not part of India, but under direct 
British occupation. Hence, India's independence from Great Britain did 
34 
not confer upon her sovereignty over Nagaland. Using this argument, 
as well as a claim to ethnic, cultural, and racial difference from the 
Indians, representatiyes of the NFG claim an ''inherent" right to govern 
35 
themselves. The Indian government, on the other hand, views Nagaland 
as an integral part of India and maintains that complete independence 
for the Nagas is a 11 preposterous proposition. 1136 Tensions over these 
two opposing points of view eventually escalated into a full-scale re-
volt pitting Indian troops against Naga guerrillas. A truce, which 
went into effect on September 6, 1964, has continued uninterruptedly 
33Michae 1 Brecher, 11 Po li tica 1 Instability "in the New States of 
Asia," Comparative Politics, eds., Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, 
(New York, 1963), P• 622. 
34Gordon P. Means and Ingunn N. Means, "Nagaland--The Agony of 
Ending a Guerrilla War," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, nos. 3 and 4, 
(Fall and Winter, 1966-67), P• 290. 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid., pp. 290-291. 
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during several roundsof peace talks, but the problem still is far from 
solved. Since last year's elections, in faci, there have been reports 
of numerous incidents threatening the uneasy peace in Nagaland. One 
report tells of Indian reinforcements in the .. area bringing troop levels 
to between 60,000 and 80,000, while another claims the Nagas are re-
ceiving arms, munttions, a,nd training in guerrilla warfare from the 
; 37 Chinese Conunun1sts. Meanwhile, many Indians are worried about the 
effect the simmering situation might have on the country's unity. Un-
less the Nagas are "put in their places, 11 it is argued, "the dikes wi 11 
open with more of India's minorities resorting to armed violence in the 
name of national independence, and with the blessings of India's adver-
38 
saries. 11 
The language problem in India revolves primarily around two issues: 
. One is the.divisiveness inherent in the reorganization of the states 
along linguistic lines, and the other is the more limited agitation over 
the replacement of English with Hindi as the official language. The 
former issue dates back to demands made by the Indian National Congress 
in the heyday of the struggle for independence--but they were demands 
the Congress might we 11 regret in hindsight. 11 In stimulating linguis-
tic agitation," one observer has remarked, 11 the Congress Party before 
independence helped to create a monster which now challenges India's 
existence as a single nation and taxes her government's ability to 
39 maintain law and order. 11 The decision to re-draw the map of India 
37Ibid~, P• 311. 
38Ibid~, P• 310. 
39 As quoted in Palmer, p. 106. 
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along linguistic lines came to fruition in the States I Reorganization 
Act of 1956. It called for the reorganization of India into 14 states, 
with a clearly dominant language in each, with the exception of Bombay, 
which was to be enlarged instead of divided, and the Punjab, where the 
1 1 i d . h . d" 40 main prevai ing anguages were assoc ate wit Hin 1. While the act 
was generally popular over most of the country, it was bitterly re-
sented by the linguistically-divided populations of Bombay and the 
Punjab. For the next several years, news out of India was dominated by 
41 
riots, strikes, terrorism, demonstrations and mass arrests. Congress 
made a further concession--or what might be called a surrender--to the 
linguistic principle in 1960, when Bombay was divided between the 
42 
Marathi- and Gujerati-speaking peoples. Rivalry continues between 
Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab, but the problem has been at least tern-
porarily ameliorated by the coalition government in that state. The 
strain on Indian unity caused by the reorganization plan is summed up 
by Palmer in this paragraph: 
The entire agitation over linguistic states demonstrated that 
the Congress nad opened a Pandora's box indeed when it champ-
ioned the principle of the reorganization of India on a lin-
guistic basis, and it stimulated the divisive forces in India 
to such an extent as to raise doubts about the capacity of 
free India to survive as a unified state dedicated to the demo-
cratic way. Whereas most of the other basic decisions regarding 
the nature of the Indian state have tended to give meaning and 
reality to the concept of a democratic India, the reluctant con-
cessions to linguistic demands have revealed the strength of 
regional as against national loyalties.43 
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Increasing education in India apparently has tended to exacerbate the 
problem rather than relieve it. "1th~_/ extension of literacy--in the 
regional languages--to millions of persons," three authors wrote re-
63 
cently, 11 has vastly expanded the dimensions of the linguistic problem, 
44 
by multiplying the numbers of participants." 
The language problem has taken a slightly different form in the 
southern state of Madras, where violence erupted in 1965 over the plan-
ned replacement of English with Hindi as the official language. Here, 
the question was not so much one of the regional Dravidian tongue--
Tamil--versus the Aryan Hindi, but it involved the future of Tamilians 
45 
in a nation with Hindi as its official language. The issue stems 
from a decision by the framers of the Constitution of 1950 to switch 
over from English to Hindi for all official purposes after a 15-year 
period. Since only a small minority of Indians speak English, and more 
people speak Hindi than any of the other 1,652 languages or dialects in 
the country, the Tamilians argue that the change-over would give a ma-
.jor advantage in terms of jobs and educational opportunities to those 
46 
who have Hindi as their mother tongue. The issue, incidentally, was 
temporarily shelved as a result of anti-Hindi agitation and Nehru's 
death, but even the status quo is opposed by the Madras Tamilians. 
Under the present situation there is a "three-language formula" which 
was implemented in 1961 as a means of bridging the difficult switch 
44Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young, p. 42. 
45 
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.. f roni English to Hindi. This formula calls for the use of both Hindi 
and English as link languages in official business, while regional lan-
guages are to be the medium in education and state and local adminis-
. 47 
tration. The plan forces an.ambitious Indian.in. a non-Hindi state~ 
who might, for example, aspire to a position in the federal burea4cracy-
to learn three different languages: his own, Hindi, and English. The 
southern.Tamilians denounce the program as 11Hindi imperialism" and part 
of a larger plot by the north to dominate the south cultura.lly, eco-
nomically, and politically. 48 Protests against the policy resulted in 
successive waves of violence, including a week-long period in which 66 
. 49 
persons were killed. 
The foregoing review of instability and violence in India is not 
intended to leave the impression that India is ripe for a military take-
over--though the possibility of such an action was seriously considered 
by two experts on the country.so Rather, it is intended to suggest 
that the country's deep political difficulties are a retarding factor 
in efforts to initiate rapid social mobilization. A correspondent for 
the Hindustan Times reports, for example, that development schemes in 
the state of Haryana have foundered because of "continued instability 
4\bid., P• 20. 
48Ibid., P• 23. 
49Ibid., p. 25. 
50 
Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Roeber Rudolph, 11 Generals and Poli-
ticians in India, 11 Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, I).o. 1, (Spring, 1964), 
pp. 5-19, passim. The authors concluded that the tradition and organi-
zation of the military in India mediates against such a possibility--
except under circumstances in which the military was drawn into poli-
tics as an ally of political leaders. Also, it was conceded, continued 
"violence and chauvinism" could strengthen existing authoritarian ten-
dencies and create opportunities for military heroes. 
in the political field and the resultant lack of direction in the 
51 
government. 11 Similar charges have been made concerning the lack of 
65 
coordination in the construction of the MIG aircraft factory; one part 
of it is located in Maharashtra, another in Orissa nearly a thousand 
miles away, and the electronic equipment for the aircraft will be pro-
. 52 
duced in Andhra, several hundred miles from the other two plants. If 
the data is insufficient to demonstrate conclusively that political in-
stability and violence are the cause of India's inertia in initiating 
rapid social mobilization, it seems reasonable to assert that the task 
would be far easier if no such problems existed. 
The Case of Turkey 
A number of the nations involved in this study might be used as 
examples to illustrate both the second and third corollary hypotheses. 
The second holds that rapid social mobilization will, in the short run, 
place stresses and strains ·on the political system which will be made 
manifest by recurrent violence or instability, and the third maintains 
that the mobilizational process will, in the long run, become institu-
tionalized to such a degree that rapid social mobilization may continue 
without straining the political process. The relationship between 
these propositions lies, of course, in the fact that the short run 
eventually becomes the long run, and the number of years spanned by 
such an evolution may vary from country to country. Analysis of the 
hypotheses if further complicated by circumstances under which short-run 
51Hindustan Times, "Power Politics Bars Development," by Kapil 
Verma, (October 18, 1967), P• 7. 
52Bha~ia, pp. 654-655. 
66 
violence ~~y be absorbed by long-run institutionalization, and therefore 
constitute no real threat to the political regime or constitutional 
order. In Japan and Italy, for example, the rapid urbanization and 
industrialization of the post-World War II period produced serious 
social dislocations expressed, for the most part, in the rise of ex-
tremist political parties and militant interest groups. However, as 
Samuel P. Huntington would put it, the level of institutionalization in 
these two countries was high enough to channel these interests into the 
normal political processes, thereby preventing a serious political up-
53 
heaval. In Turkey, on the other hand, an increasingly-aggressive 
peasantry leaped s_o alarmingly into the political arena that the mili-
tary was moved to step in and seize power through a coup d'etat. In 
this case--to borrow another phrase from the Huntington analysis-~rapid 
increases in mobilization and participation had undermined the political 
54 
institutions. To differentiate between the two hypotheses, then, the 
analysis shall center on a single question: Under what circumstances 
may rapid social mobilization be associated with violent change in the 
political regime or constitutional order? Using such a question as a 
guide, the discussion may then be directed on the one hand toward cases 
in which political equilibrium was maintained under conditions of rapid 
social mobilization, and on the other toward cases in which the equili-
brium was upset. Those nations which maintained equilibrium in the 
face of mobilizational dislocations will be examined unde.r the third 
corollary hypothesis, while Turkey--the only nation among those in this 
53 samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Politica.1 
Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17, no. 3, (April, 1965), pp. 393-394. 
54Ibid., p. 386. 
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study in which mobilization can be said to have outrun institutionali-
55 
zation --will be discussed under the second corollary hypothesis. 
The so-called westernization of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal after 
World War Ii~ a well-known story and need not be recounted here. 
Rather, this discussion shall be concerned with more recent develop-
ments following World War II: The beginnings of rapid economic growth, 
the establishment of a two-party system, the victory of the Democratic 
Party in 1950, and the coup d'etat undertaken by the military in 1960. 
Particular attention shall be focused on the politicization of the 
peasantry and the impact of its emergence into the political arena, 
with the primary point being the manner in which rapid social mobiliza-
tion contributed to an unstable political situation. 
In spite of the successes scored by Kemal Ataturk 1 s efforts to 
drag his medieval country into the 20th Century, the effects, for the 
most part, were limited to the urban areas. Indeed, statistics re-
leased after Ataturk 1 s death in 1938 showed some progress in economic 
development, primarily in road and rail improvements and a slight 
56 
amount of industrialization, but the rural areas remained relatively 
unchanged. Agricultural development was neglected, new law codes were 
either unheard of or ignored, literacy rates remained low, and general 
57 
living conditions .were primitive. Indicative of the gap that existed 
between life in the cities and life in the villages are these comments 
55 b.d I 1 ., p. 421. 
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by a student from Istambul, who visited a village school teacher a few 
years after the death o.f Mustafa Kemal: 
Mahmut-my dear fellow, the squalor, the primitive conditions 
in this village--they're indescribable! What do people mean 
by having houses and stables in these conditions? It might 
be the5~tone Age, which one only reads about in history 
books. 
The very process of modernization tended to create a dual society, with 
a thin layer of the urban elite stretched over the much larger body of 
rural peasantry. Inevitably, this caused tensions, and in the course of 
time the urban and educated classes became frustrated by the apathy of 
the peasant and his slow rate of progress. As a result, they developed 
59 
authoritarian and paternal tendencies. The peasant, meanwhile, felt 
neglected and abused. Furthermore, he was opposed to the government's 
anticlerical policies and favored a return to Muslim principles and 
. 60 practices. 
Kemal himself had envisioned the establishment of a multiparty 
system in Turkey, and, in fact, attempted in both 1924 and 1930 to end 
the official monopoly of his Republican Peoples' Party by permitting 
61 
the establishment of short-lived but legitimate oppositions. By 
1945, new pressures began mounting which made untenable the continuance 
of the Republican Party as the country's sole avenue of political 
58rbid. 
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.expression. To the internal stresses described above were added de-
mands from the connnercial classes, who wished more opportunities· for 
free enterprise; from the laboring groups, who wanted the right to or-
.ganize and strike, and from the liberals, who· were dis.satisfied with 
the party's oppressive monopoly of power and wished to see the democrat-
ic ideals of the Kemalist.revolution expressed more concretely in the 
country's political life. 62 Externally, there were pressures from 
Turkey's friends among the western democracies in the United Nations to 
end her authoritarian regime and extend to her own people the blessings 
of free and meaningful elections. The situation was becoming embaras-
sing to the Turks themselves, as reflected by the wit of one critic who 
referred to Ataturk as the "eternal chief" and to his successor, Ismet 
Inonu, as the "unchangeable chief. 11 63 A split in the party ranks pro-
vided the opportunity, and on January 7, 1946, four dissident members 
of the RPP founded the Democratic Party. 
The new part.y's first foray into Turkish politics was a somewhat 
shoddy affair. As Hisham B. Sharabi has written, 11 the RPP not only saw 
to it that all facilities that could be denied its rival were actually 
denied it but also did all it could.to intimidate voters and to manipu-
64 
'late the final results of the elections. Consequently, the Democratic 
Party managed to win but 62 seats in an Assembly composed of 464 
65 deputies. In the four years preceding the election of 1950, however, 
62:rbid O p. 51. 
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there developed between the two parties real competition for the 
.hearts--and the votes--of the people. These efforts set into motion a 
.maelstrom which was eventually to break the membraneous surface tension 
of the elite and bring the rural masses into full political participa-
tion. · The Democratic Party, inheriting support :from the ingrained 
opposition to the Establishment, emerged from the 1946 elections as a 
viable opposition in spite of its pitiful showing. And the Republican 
Party, its monopoly finally broken, knew it could no longer depend upon 
fraud to maintain its pre-eminent position. For the first time, the 
peasant became the object of political courtship, and efforts by the 
two parties aimed at winning his allegiance gave him a reason as well 
as a wi 11 to express his demands. Kemal .. H. Karpat summed up the effects 
of the two-party system in these sentences: 
The mobilization and political education of the masses o.c-
. curred not as a result of a premediated plan but as an ac-
cidental result of the need to secure votes and support at 
a popular level. Indeed, according to the new democratic 
ideas, the source of power did not reside in small elite 
groups but in the masses, hitherto ignored. The search for 
popular support forced both the Republicans and the Democrats 
to establish thousands of party organizations throughout the 
villages and towns of Turkey, which became centers of poli-
tical education and social mobilization. 66 
To the villagers, whose previous contact with the inst.ruments of govern-
ment had been limited ta occasional visits from the gendarmerie and tax. 
collector, the showering of attention by the two parties was stimulating 
and exhilirating. At the same time, the Democratic Party became a 
rallying point for various other elements of the society who were dis-
enchanted with the Republicans' reforms and econemic policies. Still, . . 
66Kemal H. Karpat, 11 Society, Economics, and Politics in Contempo-
rary 'l'urkey," World Politics, Vol. 17, rio. 1, (October, 1964), p. 57. 
71 
the magnitude of the Democr.atic Party's victory in the 1950 elect ions 
was surprising: With 89 percent of the eligible voters turning out to 
the polls, the Democrats captured 54 percent of the votes and more than 
67 
80 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. 
After a smooth and orderly transfer of power from Inonu to Adnan 
Menderes, the new prime minister, the Democratic Party embarked upon a 
program of economic development, liberalization of various restrictive 
68 laws, and a partial relaxing of religious restrictions. The last was 
aimed primarily at the traditional-minded peasants, who had long resent-
ed the abolishment of Islam as the official state religion. The pro-
grams having the greatest and most lasting effects upon the peasantry, 
however, were those dealing with economic development and social inte-
gration. A highway construction program opened the rural areas to 
urban markets, simultaneously facilitating transportation and travel 
and exposing the villager to the opportunities and advantages of the 
69 
outside world. Agricultural prices went up, agricultural and indus-
trial credits were freely granted by the government and generous amounts 
of foreign aid were provided. As a result, the private sector of the 
d d , dl . 7° C 1 d' d b economy expan e rapi y. oncurrent y, ra ios an newspapers ·egan 
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became a force for modernization as peasant draftees were given techni-
cal training and exposure to new ideaa. Consequently, the first half 
of the decade decade during which the Democratic Party was in control 
·saw very rapid economic development. Karpat credits the liberal eco-
nomic policy of the party with leading to the integration of the vil-
lages and towns into larger economic units, and to the full emergence 
of a cash economy and production for market. As a result: 
New jobs were provided for millions of people in transporta-
tion, machine maintenance, food processing, small industries, 
and other related fields. Land values increased, credit fa-
cilities were expanded, and usury was considerably reduced. 
People were aroused from centuries of social and economic 
inertia and discovered new goals and opportunities in life. 
Certainly Turkey became incomparably more dynamic in the 1950 1 s 
than in the 1930 1 s and·l940 1 s. One can readily. perceive in 
any town in Anatolia the changes in living and ment,ality that 
have occurred in the past fifteen years.72 
The Menderes regime was re-elected in 1954.by an even larger majority, 
winning about 56 percent of the vote and 503 of the 541 seats. And 
despite some economic difficulties caused by inflation, adverse weather, 
and a drop in agricultural prices, it was returned to power in 1957 by 
the still-comfortable margin of 424 out of 610. seats. 
In the meantime, the same charges began to be made against the 
Democrats that previously had been hurled at the Republicans. To Middle 
East specialist Hisham Sharabi, the charges were justified: 11 The party 
in power not only tolerated little criticism" he wrote, 11 but showed it-
self willing to use any means short of the direct use of violence to 
73 
maintain itself in power. 11 A. Haluk Ulman and Frank Tachau_explained 
thaj:, in the face of economic difficulties and the rising tide of 
72 Karpat, p. 59. 
73 Sharabi, p. 59. 
73 
opposition, 11 the leaders of the Democratic Party began to bring pres-
sure on the.ir opponents, primarily through a narrowing of democratic 
O h 74 rig ts." On the other side of the ledger, however, the political re-
pression failed to excite any strong reaction in the countryside, 
where matters remained much as they had since the Democrats came to 
75 
power. And Josephs. Szyliowicz appears to believe the party's op-
ponents refused to wait for a return to authority through peaceful 
means. 11 There was ••• reason to believe," he quotes a Turkish observer, 
"that there was afoot a deliberate move to destroy the Menderes admin-
76 
istration by ways other than defeating it at the polls." At any rate, 
the military, on May 27, 1960, suddenly abandoned a long-standing tra-
dition of political neutrality and stepped in to overthrow the Menderes 
government. 
It is not the purpose of this discussion to weigh the relative 
merits of military intervention in times of real or imagined political 
crisis. It should be sufficient to point out that the leader of the 
coup, General Cemal Gursel, felt intervention was necessary "to remove 
those conditions which made possible the dictatorship of the single 
party and to provide for political opposition and an equitable distri-
bution of power." 77 In apparent pursuit of these ideals, the junta 
voluntarily abandoned its control of the government in 1961 to permit 
elections and a return to parliamentary procedures. Of greater 
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significance to this study are the reasons why military intervention 
was deemed necessary. If the coup is viewed in perspective, the most 
reasonable explanation seems to be that the rapid social mobilization of 
the peasantry--by far the majority of the population--resulted in the 
emergence of a huge new group of voters. This led to an intensification 
of the struggle among the various competing elites, each of which sought 
to win the allegiance of this new source of political power. As one 
elite--the Democratic Party--won the allegiance of the rural elements, 
it adopted policies designed to please and therefore retain its support-
ers. Unsurprisingly, the other elites tended to take a dim view of 
these policies, which, in due course, led to further polarization of 
interests and increased bitterness. It was at a certain point in this 
cycle that the military decided to step in and bring the crunch of 
events to a halt, acting, in its own eyes, as a stabilizing rather than 
destabilizing force. This analysis is supported, in its general out-
lines, by Ulman and Tachau: 
In short, the coup of May 27, 1960, should be regarded as an 
integral part of the developing struggle between the more tra-
ditional masses of villagers and small townsmen on the one hand 
and the more modernized urban elite on the other. It was thus· 
not simply a blow for Turkish democracy. Rather, it was an 
attempt to stem the tide of rising power of newly emerging 
socio-economic groups.78 
Karpat was equally to the point: 
••• the introduction of a multiparty system in 1945-46, and the 
subsequent acquisition of power.by the Democratic Party in 1950, 
started an intensive upward mobility that shattered the pre-
vious power structure. There is no reason to believe that 
either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, the main 
protagonists in this political struggle, had advisedly sought 
78 . 
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to release the lower social groups or wanted to change the 
elite organization and its philosophy.79 
Assuming the validity of this analysis, it is possible to isolate at 
75 
least two characteristics of the Turkish political system which rendered 
it unequipped to cope with the destabilizing effects of rapid social 
mobilization. First, its level of institutionalization was too low, as 
can be determined by the inability of the system to adapt to the chang-
ing conditions brought about by the emergence of a large new bloc of 
voters. Second, the system was non-consensual in that the elite in 
power was continually threatened by a counter-elite with substantially 
different goals and philosophies. The latter could perhaps have been 
remedied had the Turkish leaders in the Republican Party co-opted the 
Democrat's primary power source, namely, the newly-mobilized peasants. 
On the other hand, the low level of institutionalization of the system 
may have prevented such a manuever. If the charges leveled against the 
Democrats are accepted at face value, i.e., that they had no compunc-
tions against resorting to extra-legal or even unconstitutional methods 
to stay in control, then this was surely the case. 
The More-Developed Nations 
It is now time to consider those polities in which the social 
mobilization process has become institutionalized to such a degree that 
rapid social mobilization may continue without straining the political 
system to the point of instability. For the most part, nations falling. 
into this category are characterized by a comparatively high degree of 
economic and political development. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
79 Karpat, p. 57. 
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note that those nations in this study which appear to be best equipped 
to handle rapid social mobilization also have the highest rate of 
social mobilization. The one notable exception to this generalization 
is Canada, whose comparatively low rate of social mobilization is due 
to the fact that its very high degree of social mobilization leaves 
little room for the indicators of social and economic development to 
move in an upward direction •. However, other countries in this classi-
fication--Japan, Israel, Italy, Spain, Mexico., and, to a lesser extent, 
The Phi lippines--underwent tremendous social changes in the 15-year 
period covered by this study, primarily as the result of sustained 
economic booms. In each of these countries, the wrenching effects of 
rapid social mobilization produced political problems, usually mani-
fested by varying degrees of violence, extremist movements, or both. 
The governments of these nations, however, have thus far managed to ab-
sorb, resolve, or even ignore suchproblems without upsetting the equi-
librium of their political systems. It shall be the purpose of this 
discussion to search for and hopefuily provide a description of the 
circumstances u.nder which this may be accomplished. The question by 
which the analysis shall be guided is this: .Under what conditiqns may 
·political stability be maintained in the face of rapid social mobili-
zation? 
Claude Ake has theorized that the political system undergoing : . 
social mobilization maximizes its capacity for carrying out. the process 
and remaining stable despite the potentially disruptive short-run 
effects of so.cial mobilization if it is "authoritarian, paternal, 
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identific, and consensuai.11 80 Another theorist, Samue 1 Huntington, has 
maintained that the.strength of political organizationsand procedures 
varies with their scope of support and level of institutionalization, 
with stability being insured for those. societies in which a high level 
of institutionalization prevents rapid modernization from undermining 
81 
the political institutions and thereby causing decay. Of the 10 1 
nations examined in this study, the country which perhaps comes closest 
to fulfilling these conditions is the state of Israel. 
A partial explanation for the.success of Israel in avoiding many 
of the problems that plague other states undergoing rapid social mobili-
zation is provided by the uncomfortable proximity of her h<:>stile Arab 
neighbors. That the existence of such a nearby threat greatly enhances 
the ability of a goyernm~nt to maintain itself in power and rule effec-· 
82 
tively has been authoritatively demonstrated by Paul C. Rosenblatt. 
More to the point, however, is Israel's possession of those qualities 
held by Ake to be essential for the maintenance of stability during a 
mobilizational situation. Its government's power is large, concentrated, 
and easily mobilized, as demonstrated by its success in bringing Israel 
into existence as a nation and successfully prosecuting three wars 
against the Arabs. .The country has a political class that is willing 
and able to lead, .the civic body certainly considers that it has some 
interest in the continued existence of the government, and its level 
· 80 Ake, p. 101. These terms were defined at the beginn,ing of tgis 
chapter.. 1 
81Huntington, p. 386. 
82Paul C. Rosenblatt, "Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism 
and Nationalism, 11 Journal of. Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, no. 2, (1964), 
pp. 131-145, particularly p;- 141. 
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. of consensus is extremely high. Numerous features of the Israeli state 
may be cited as evidence to support these as~ertions. Its citize.n army~ 
for example, acts as a .great leveler and melting pot; by being the 
country's principal marriage mart, as well as providing both men and 
women with an opportunity to take an active part in the defense of 
83 
their country. ;As is well known, Israel places great emphasis upon 
·. its existence as a national homeland for the .Jews, its ancient cultural 
heritage, its national religion, and its revival of Hebrew 'as the 
national language. In addition, Israel, for a new state, has an un-
usually well-developed set of political institutions. The Jewish 
Agency--founded in Jaffa in 1908--had an elected assembly, a.budget, a 
84 
bureaucracy, and a secret army, the Haganah. It operated, as Sharabi 
points out, as 11a government within a government, lacking only the at-
85 
tribute of .sovereignty. 11 By .the time de jure statehood was achieved 
in 1948, the assembly was experienced and well-equipped to continue its 
legislative functions as the Israel Knesset. Even Israel I s political 
parties pre-date statehood. The Mapai, for example, has played a 
. . .86 
dominant role in Israeli politics since the early 1930 1 s, and sti 11 
provides the country with much of its leadership. 87 A final point 
worth considering is the quality of Israel's population. At the time 
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Edward A. Bayne, 11 Development and the Cultural Reinforcement of 
Class," Expectant Peoples, ed~, K. H. Silvert, p. 377. 
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Sharabi, 11 Israel, 11 p. 170. 
85Ibid. 
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. Scot.t D. Johnston, "The Politics of Transition in Israel," 
Studies .2.3· Asia, Vol. 8, (1967), p. 172. 
87Ibid. Cf. Bayne, P• 391. 
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Israel became a state, nearly 90 percent of its Jewish population had 
imiiligrated to the Middle East from the socially-and-economically-
88 
advanced societies of Europe and America.· In terms of a population 
producing a political class able to adapt to changing conditions, this, 
too, is an indication of a high level of institutionali~ation. 
While Israel has suffered little from the destabilizing effects of 
social mobilization, Japan and Italy have been forced to seek solutions. 
Many of the problems faced by these two states may be traced to rapid 
industrialization, over-urbanization, a breakdown of traditional values, 
the "revolution of rising frustrations, 11 . and the emergence of extremi.st 
groups--all of which are concomitants of rapid social mobilization. In 
Italy, for example: 
••• equalitarian ideals have been propagated by labor organizers 
and aspiring politicians in even the most remote villages. The 
once lethargic masses of humble and poor folk have become socially 
and politically aroused. Strikes, occupations of untille.d larid 
and factories, public gatherings and demonstrations have been 
spurred as a means to exacerbate social tensions and channel 
social discontent into mass support of labor organizations 
and extremist politicians. The numerous poor and lowly born 
Italians have become increasingly unhappy and frustrated over 
their economic and social lot, despite actual improvements in 
their living standards, simply because they have been led to 
expect revolutionary improvements and total equality. Their 
value aspirations have §rown much too fast for existing social 
and economic realities. 9 
And in Japan: 
In the enormous flux of the postwar period when practically 
everybody was on the move, the family itself often seemed to 
have lost its cohesive force •••• As more and more people 
from 'elsewhere' moved to cities to live and work, ties with 
88Judah Matras, Social Change in Israel, (Chicago, 1965), p. 54. 
89c1ifford A. L. Rich, "Foundations of Italian Politics, 11 
European Politics and Government, ed., c. A. L. Rich, (New York, 1962), 
p. 273. 
the village home and local temple grew somewhat more tenuous. 
The ramified. family system, now legally abolished, began 
to. give way, especially in cities, to the 'nuclear' family 
of parents·· and their chiiaren. Within this smaller family, 
communication between the generations became difficult and some-
times quite impossible. Those who grew up during or just after 
the war re.pud.iated · the authority of their elders, and particu,-
larly in the:citi~s.Joined a new generation which confused free-
.dom with license. Exploding urban growth deepened the gap be-
80 
tween .social'pa:'tter.ns.in city a~d country areas. Vulgar mass 
media spread a riib-ilistic sexuality appalling to older people. 
This phenomenon is not solely Japanese, but the war left a · 
chasm between young and old that cut across most of the vertical, 
hierarchical compartments of·Japanese society. One saw this 
in the disorderliness of students, in changing attitudes toward 
birth cont.rol and the care of the aged, and in other contexts. 90 
Evidence of these social dislocations has been marked in both Japan and 
. Italy by frequent outbursts of political violence--usually limited to 
demonstrations and riotin/-1-and to an extreme fact.ionalization of the 
political party system. 92 As was the case inTurkey, the newly-emerging 
classes in Japan and Italy became the target of parties--especially 
those on the Left--which sought to use .. the mobilized masse.s in a power 
ploy aimed at smashing the more traditional and more conservative ruling 
groups. In Italy, the Commu.nist Party was the biggest beneficiary of 
social change, growing to the second largest single party, while in 
93 
Japan the Socialist Party was the big gainer. 
90 Lawrence Olson, "The Elite, Industrialism, and Nationalism: 
Japan," Expectant Peoples, ed., K. H. Silvert, pp. 411-412. 
=: . 
91 The New York Times Index, 1951-,.1966.. See also Appendix B of 
this report• 
92For thorough discussions of the two political party systems, 
Warren M. rsuneishi, Japanese Palitical Style, (New York, 1966), . 
Chapter Seven (especially page 124) and Dante Germino and Stefano 
Passigli, The Govern.merit and Palitics of Italy, (New York, 1968) 1 
Chapter Fi~(especially page ·121~) - · . 
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Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan, (Boston, 
1963), p. 126. 
see 
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Unlike Turkey, however, in neither country were these emergent forces 
large enough t.o shatter the existing political system. Several factors 
appear to account for thi~. For one thing, social mobilization is not 
a recent phenomenon in either Japan or Italy. It began, in fact, in 
the same decade for both countries: In Italy, with the unification of 
the Peninsula in 1861, 94 and in Japan with the restoration of the Meiji 
Emperor in 1868. 95 . The effect of both these events was a new sense of 
nationalism, a growing sense of identity, and a strident surge toward 
modernization. The last o.f these was particularly true for Japan, 
which felt an urgent need to adopt the technology of the west in order 
96 to counter the military and colonial threat of the west. In Italy, 
the process was more gradual, though again, the Italian~ too, felt a 
.. 97 
need to keep pace with the more advanced nations of Europe. The pro-
cess of social mobilization, therefore, became institutionalized in 
advance of the rapid social and economic development that characterized 
the post-war years, with both countries building huge stores of social 
overhead capital. Other factors contributing to stabi 1i ty in the face 
of rapid social mobilization are bound up in the autonomy and complexity 
of the political i~stitutions, of which the factionalization of the 
political parties serves as evidence. In both countries, any number of 
coalitions among the pro-system parties are possible in order to insure 
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Liberal-Democratic Party is of suffi.cient strength to fend off the 
. Socialist Party, while in Italy the centrist pro-system parties 
(Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists, Republicans and Liberals). 
control a majority of votes. Although factionalism may produce some ad-
ministrative instability, with cabinets occasionally shuffled to. provide 
a Left-wing or Right-wing flavor, the possibility of a breakdown in the 
political system is remote. 
The Philippines, ranked eighth in social mobilization and seventh 
in political stability, provides an interesting case for analysis un-
der the third corollary hypothesis. On the one hand, it is tempting 
to ctte the nation as an example in which rapid development has resulted 
in political decay, as judged from its high rate of .urbanization 
98 
(some 2.3 percent per year:) . and from its. chronic political violence 
and stubborn Huk rebellion. The temptation is increased by statements 
from President Ferdinand Marcos, who on one occasion stated that 
.l!Filipinos have ceased to value ord~r. Justice and security are myths. 
Our government is gripped in the iron hand of venality, its treasury 
is barren." And on another occasion he declared that conditions had 
combined to produce an outlook of the people characterized by despair 
· and that the country had been dangerously close to "a sudden UP.-
. 99 
rising." On the other hand,however, it would be imprudent to predict 
an imminent revolution for the island republic. For one can not ignore 
that "the principle of transfer of political power by popular franchise 
98 
According to statistics gathered for this study.· See Table I 
in Chapter II. 
99 David Wurfe 1, 11 The Philippines: Intensified Dialogue," Asian 
Survey, Vol. 7, na. 1, (January, 1967), p. 48. 
has been respected at; all levels, and its official results have been 
1©0 
challenged only by legal recourse," On two occasions, in fact, 
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power was transferred peacefully to a relative unknown political figure 
.when the president was removed by death, which is a trying condition in 
any country. For the time being, therefore, The Philippines shall be 
categerized in this study.as a nation in which institutionalization has 
kept pace with mobilization, permitting rapid bursts of palitical, 
economic and social development without upsetting the equilibrium. The 
most convincing explanation to this assertion is provided by Jean 
101 ·· 
Grossholtz. According to her analysis, the forces of change, litera-
cy, industrialization, . and urbanization, 11 have broadened p,erceptions of 
I 
politics arid political action and provided a basis for differentiating 
102 
the electorate into. specific interest grQups. 11 Since these differ-
ent groups have institutionalized methods far competing with one :. 
another, i.e., through the electoral and political process, politics 
in The Phil;lppines have come to be characterized by a spirit of bar-
gaining. 11 Those who would play active political roles must constantly 
bargain for the continued support of a constituency and with. their 
~eers for the wherewithall to maintain that continuous support," she 
103 
says. It is abvious, she adds, that the willingness to bargain is 
lOODavid T. Sternberg, 11 The Philippines: Contour and Perspec~ 
tive, 11 Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, no. 3, (April, 1966), p. 502. 
1101 
Jean Grossholtz, Politics in The Philippines, (Boston, 1964). 
Much of the discussion in this part of the study is based upon Miss 
Grossholtz' searching analysis presented in the introduction to this 
book. 
l02Ibid., p. 6. 
lOJibid., PP• 7-8. 
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related to the individual's sense of a predictable world in which con-
flict is not wholly destructive and other people can be trusted. Such 
an attitude is much more conducive to tqe politics of evolution than to 
the politic~ :;of Tevolution. These coriditions would appear to be ideal 
to the maintenance of a stable political order. 
It is hardly necessary to discuss Canada under this hypothesis. 
Socially and economically, the nation greatly resembles the United 
States, while politically, it appears to be something of a hybrid be-
tween the United States and Great Britain: Though it has a parliamen-
tary system of government, it has three political parties with a high 
degree of consensus on fundamentals. The third party, in fact, was 
formed as something of an alternative to the two major parties, and 
attracts only a small percentage of the votes. Social mobilization has 
been underway for such a long period of .time in Canada that it presents 
no destabilization problems, though separatist tendencies may be seen 
among the French Canadians. That particular problem, however, revolves 
around national identity and language rather than social. mobilization. 
This chapter shall be concluded with mention of Spain and Mexico, 
countries ranked similarly in terms of social mobilization and stability. 
Both countries, as well, are dominated by sipgle parties: The Falange 
in Spain and the Par~ Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico. 
Franco, for all intents and purposes, has retired and turned the ad-
ministration of Spain over to an elite Catholic group known as the 
104 
Opus~· Though Franco will continue to appoint the Prime Minister 
in accordance with the Organic Law of 1965, the name will be chosen 
104claire Sterling, "Franco's Foes Stop Hoping," The Reporter, 
. (February 25, 1965), p. 33. 
from a list provided him by his Council of Ministers. A virtual die-
tatorship, Spain has been highly stable under the extended Franco re-
gime, but continued stability rests upon two questions: Wi 11 it con-
tinue to control internal pressures, and what will happen when Franco 
105 
goes? The Spanish Constitution calls for a restoration of the 
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monarchy upon Franco's demise, but whether the actual reins of govern-
ment will be left in the hands of an appointed successor is a matter of 
speculation. In the meantime, internal pressures are the concern of 
the Opus Dei and the hand-picked parliament,, the Cortes, which relaxes 
or tightens controls as circumstances demand. In Mexico, rival interest 
groups fight out their bat_t les within the PRI, and thus far have pre-
106 
served a balance of· power. Stability may be maintained in Mexico so 
long as economic a-qd social development continues within the planned 
framework of the government, but. there is one disquieting note: The 
Mexican Indian is something of a forgotten person in the Mexican poli-
tical system. Largely illiterate, he cares little for political or 
judicial institutions. But he can be aroused, as evidenced by the 
localized revolt c~rried out by a group of Indians displaced by a dam 
project in 1954. 10~ If social mobilization is eventually to spread to 
the Indian population and the 11marginal Mexican," the political system 
will be forced to respond. 
105 Richard Comyns Carr, 11 The Outlook for Spain's Economy," World 
Today, Vol. 23, no., 1, (January, 1967), p. 30. 
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The New York Times Index, 1954. The rebels were led by Gen. 
Henrique:z Guzma"n: (mentioned earlier in this study in Chapter II). 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
As a further step in recent attempts to arrive at meaningful 
generalizations concerning the effects of social and economic develop-
ment upon the polit_ical process, this study was unde.rtaken for the pur-
pose of investigating the relationship between social mobilization and 
political stability in 10 different societies. At the outset, it in-
volved two problems in research and design: The definition and measure-
ment of ~ocial mobilization, and the definition and measurement of poli-
tical stability. From the standpoint of methodology, these problems 
~ 
were approached in such a manner as to yield similar results to anyone 
else who might care to repeat the study. Others, perhaps, may wish to 
use different indicators in measuring social mobilization. Or they may 
desire to use more or fewer indicators. However, so long as a range of 
indicators broad enough to encompass the social, economic and politi~al 
factors of development is employed in the measurement of this process, 
the results should not prove to be significantly different. Many such 
indicators, for example, correlate so highly with other indicators of 
social mobilization that they are virtually interchangeable. In this 
study, gross national product per capita and. radio receiving sets per 
1,000 persons correlated at .97. In another study, a similarly high 
correlation was discovered between per capita national income and the 
86 
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infant mortality rate.l It is altogether conceivable that, at some 
future date, ·a quite small number of indicators may be used to yield 
findings now discoverable only through the use of a quite large number 
of indicators. For the degree of discrimination required in this 
study, the. number and type of indicators used in the social mobilization 
modelwere found to be sufficient. The scale devised in the study for 
. the measurement of political stability, it is believed, attained an 
equally high degree of accuracy and discrimination. One shortcoming of 
the design should be pointed out, however. While the political events 
included in the scale are numbered zero through 26, there is occasional-
ly more distance between measurable phenomena than a mere digit. For 
example, a change in party leadership and demonstrations opposing the 
government are numbered six and seven, respectively. Between these 
two digits, howeve:1:-, lies a hard decision--the dechio:n to hold a 
demonstration. As .a mental process, it cannot be measured; yet, it is 
a political event. A similar methodology was employed by Ivo and Rosa-
2 
lind Feierabend. For greater sp·ecificity, these researchers scaled 
the frequency and magnitude of the political events in order to reach 
a finer degree of discrimination among their 84 nations. A comparison 
of the results of that study with the results of this study reveals 
. agreement. in all but .one case. The Feierabends rated The Philippines 
their most stable country, while this study rated that nation seventh 
among the 10 studied. While their study did not discuss specific 
1 
Stockwell, p. 432. 
2rvo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, 11 Aggressive Behaviors. Within 
Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-Polity Study," Journal of Conflict 
~esolution," Vol. 10, no. 3, (September, 1966), pp. 249-271. 
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findings, it can only be assumed that they ignored the Huk rebellion, 
as well as the violence which accompanies elections in The Philippines. 
In this thesis, such violence was held to be an important element in the 
determination of political stability. 
I 
This study held as ~ts primary hypothesis that. social mobiliza-
tion is significant to--or bears a significant relationship for--the 
political process. Connected with this primary hypothesis were three 
corollary hypothese.s: (1) That a certain amount of stability is neces-
say before rapid social mobilization may be successfully undertaken; 
(2) That, in the short run, rapid social mobilization will place stres-
ses and strains upon the political system which will be made manifest 
by indications of instability, and (3) That, in the long run, the 
social mobilizational process will become instituti_onalized and permit 
further mobilization without unduly straining the political system or 
upsetting the political equilibrium. 
In demonstrating the primary hypothesis, the 10 nations were 
ranked, one through ten, according to the degree and rate of social 
mobilization and the degree of political stability. Next, the Spear-
man's Rank Correlation Coefficient was computed for the two variables. 
The correlation worked out to an extremely high .82. Furthermore, the 
ranking was identical for the first four countries. The only real 
exception to the general trend, in fact, was Argentina, a well-
developed country which has seen one military takeover after another. 
In search of a reasonable explanation for this deviance, the political 
culture of Argentina was examined and found to be essentially pre-
national and non-integrated. Also, there was a definite lack of 
consensus among the competing interest groups, who trod with impunity 
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upon one another in pressuring the country's simplistic political in-
stitutions. 1n subsequent analyses, cultural integration and consensus 
on fundamentals were found to be essential elements. in a stable poli-
~ical .system. Viewed from this perspective, Argentina is less an ex-
ception than it at first appears. Had national integration, encultura-
tion, and institutionalization--in the Huntington sense--been included-
ed as elements of social mobilization, Argentina doubtless would have 
- been ranked lower on the social mobilizational scale. 
The first corollary hypothesis was somewhat more difficult to pin 
down. It held that a certain amount of stability was necessary in a 
country before rapid social mobilization. could be successfully under-
taken. But the question--still to be answered, perhaps--is this: How 
much is a "certain amount? 11 Apparently, the amount of.stability re-
quired for successful mobilization lies somewhere between that found 
in India and that found, for instance, in Japan. Though efforts to 
quantify this "cert·ain amount" of stability on this level of analysis 
might fall short of the mark, it could provide a framework and a foun-
dation for answering the question in future research. It is possible, 
as has-been shown in this study, to quantify political violence as an 
indication of instability and compare this phenomenon with other 
nations. It is also poisible to isolate as a factor of political in-
stability a lack of consensus, as demonstrated in India and discussed 
in this study. These are variables with which the researcher canwork 
in the continuing search for explanation. In this study, these varia-
bles were used to differentiate between India and the other nine states. 
Interestingly, the first corollary hypothesis adds a dimension to 
the study of economic development and public policy only touched upon, 
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when considered at all, by other political scientists. It constitutes 
something of a back-door approach to the theory of economic determinism. 
Most of the literature in circulation today views development as a pre-
condition for .stability, rather than stability as a precondition for 
3 development. It would seem just as reasonable to approach the problem 
from one side as from the other, particularly, if the more accepted view-
.. 
point leads, as it might in some instances, up a blind alley. This 
holds obvious implications for _public policy, especially on behalf of 
the aid-giving nations. Why, it might ~ell be asked, should billions 
be spent on nations too unstable to fruitfully deploy these funds for 
social and economic development? On the other hand, if this point may 
be carried further, some nations might wish to pursue those policies 
whi·ch would lead to a Stable political system in order to qualify for 
economic assistance. It is not the purpose of this discussion, ·of 
course, to lobby for the acceptance of one viewpoint over the other. 
These implications are mentioned merely as illustrations of how con~ 
clusions based on the first corollary hypothesis might be used to in-
crease the number of options available to both the aid-giving and aid-
receiving nations. 
In the second corollary hypothesis, the country of Turkey was 
cited and discussed as an example of how rapid social mobilization may 
\ . 
lead· to political instability. Particular attention should be paid, 
however, to the manner in which political instability came about. in 
Turkey. Many studies--the Benjamin and Kautsky paper, for example--
3Both Lerner and Lipset correlate economic development with demo-
cracy or political, participation. See also the Diamant article refer-
red to earlier in this study. 
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emphasize the theoretical possibility of new groups gaining status and 
power as a result o_f social mobilization, and then using this newiy-won 
status and power to. overthrow the existing and often moire traditional 
order, In Turkey, however, the inclusion of new groups in the political 
process increased competition among the.existirtg elites, creati~g an 
aura of crisis so u_ntenable as to invite military intervention. At no 
time did the Turkis.h peasantry seek,. on its own behalf, to overthrow. 
the existing governmeµt, ~or did its members demand admittance to the 
power structure. Instead, the involvement of the peasantry in politics 
merely acted as a catalyst to produce an. unstable situation. There"-
fore, it should be worthwhile in the future to cite Turkey as an ex-
ample of a departure from the standard model with which students of 
social mobilization have become familiar, As social mobilization is a 
complex, multifaceted process, so are the ramifications of social mo-
bilization upon the political process. This, too, could open another 
area of study. For, as perceptions are broadened, so are the avenues 
of research leading to explanations of thiis phenomena. 
In. the third corollary hypothes.is, the remaining seven nations 
were cited as examples of countries in which the social mobilizational 
process had become institutionalized, permitting further mobilization· 
without upsetting th~ political equilibrium. In essence, the discus-
sion of this hypothesis, as well as the others, led as a matter of 
course to a search for a definitive list of those criteria which insure 
stability under any ci_rcumstances short of military conquest, As men-
tioned in relation to the case of Turkey, so.cial mobilization has many 
· ramifications which may lead to an assault on the political system. 
By the same token, some assaults on the political system may be similar 
92 
to those which can be traced to rapid social mobilization, but in 
actuality are in no way connected with social mobilization. The United 
States and Canada, for example, are highly-developed societies in 
which social mobilization--as a disruptive force--is a thing of the 
past. Yet both of these countries find themselves under siege by for-
ces which, in a less-developed country, might well have sprung from the 
effects of rapid social mobilization. 
One of the most important criteria for the maintenance of a 
stable political system seems to be the existence of a consensus on the 
fundamental aspects of the constitutional order. This involves the 
4 
identificism and consensuality propounded by Claude Ake, as well as 
the integration held necessary by K. H. Silvert in his observations on 
5 Argentina. It is possible that this consensus may take different forms 
or perform different functions from country to country. In Israel, for 
example, the idea of a Jewish state is of sufficient force to mobilize 
the population virtually overnight in the event that the nation is 
threatened. There may be some disagreement over the form of the Jewish 
state, or over its policies, but the overriding matter of concern is 
that the state should continue to exist as a homeland for the Jewish 
people. Furthermore, the vast majority of the Israeli population feels 
an abiding, personal interest, or stake, in the continuance of the 
state and the maintenance of internal order. These factors far out-
weigh the dysfunctional effects of stresses and strains caused by 
rapid social mobilization--or, for that matter, any other problem. In 
4 Ake, p. 108 and p. 110. 
5 Silvert, pp. 350-352. 
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Japan, Italy, and other multiparty states, the consensus performs the 
function of unifying the various competing factions and elites against 
.the anti-system forces. In other words, . the various competitors for 
political power, while they may squabble incessantly among themselves, 
are still in basic agreement that control over the government should not 
fall ·into the hands of those who would alter the constitutional order or 
compromise the state's sovereignty. Some parties, for example, refuse 
to enter into coalitions with the Communist parties. Others may enter 
into grand coalitions with.their chief rivals in order to dilute the 
strength of anti-system parties. Interest groups, as well, must share 
the consensus. The alternative, as demonstrated by the case of -Argen-
tina, is to rip the society to shreds. 
Another important criterion for the maintenance of political sta-
bility is a high ~egree of institutionalization. This refers, in the 
Huntington analysis, to the adaptability, complexity, independency, and 
coherency of the political institutions? The political elite in Turkey, 
for example, was unable to adapt to the emergence of a powerful new 
voting bloc. In Argentina, the political institutions were too simple 
to withstand parochial demands and pressures from the competing interest 
groups. In neither country were the institutions so independent or 
coherent as to avoid military intervention. On the other hand, the 
more stable nations have developed institutions which are flexible and 
more independent of outside influences. They offer a means of contest-
ing differences of opinions or conflicting ideologies in thepolitical 
marketplace, ratherthan in the barracks or back-rooms of palaces. As 
6 
Huntington, pp. 394-405. 
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a matter of necessity, these procedures,have a degree of respect high 
enough so that the losers agree to abide by the results of the.cd'n:test. 
;Even the noncompetitive, single-party states have institutionalized 
measures for dealing with differences. In countries such as Spain and 
Mexico, for example, the -d·ifferences are fought out in party councils 
or among ruling oligaI'.chs. 
An environment in which there is a low level of politically-
motivated violence is desirable for the maintenance of a stable poli-
tical order, since ,this would make it less likely that violence would 
be employed against the government. However, itwould be difficult to 
conclude from the data compiled for this study that violence is neces-
sarily dysfunctional to stability •. On the contrary, it would appear 
· that violence could become an institutionalized function of the poli-
tical process, providing an outlet for-political expression and a means 
of dealing with certain political problems. In many of the countries 
examined in this study, demonstrations, riots, and even occasional acts 
of terrorism seem to be accepted methods of articulating pof.itical 
desires. And in The Philippines, literally every election is accom-
panied by assassination. Itis difficult to make generalizations about 
this type of behavior, of course, but it would seem obvious that vio~ 
lence is a legitimate area of study in relation to the political 
process. 
Naturally, it is conceded that the generalizations in this study 
cannot exceed in validity the data upon which the study was based. 
Statistics, for example, are not of unquestionable integrity, particu-
larly those reperted by the less-highly-developed countries. This 
casts an unfortunate shadow over statements concerning social 
95 
mobiUzation in such nations, but it is a shadow which cannot be 
avoided. Similar criticisms ciight be levied against newspaper reports 
upon which the measurement of political stability i.s based. Again, 
this problem is uncircumventable; the best that can be done, when 
relying upon secondary sources, is to use the best material available 
and trust to its accuracy. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 
Contained in this appendix are statistical tables showing how the 
variables of social mobilization increased or decreased over the 15-year 
period from 1950 to 1965. For each of the variables, an average annual 
rate of increase, in terms of percentage, was computed. In those in-
stances in which there was a decrease rather than an increase, the 





GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA 
-----· 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
Average Annual 
Increase(%) 1.42 2.36 1.96 8.27 6.87 13. 46 3 .32 3.66 7.66 2.95 
1965 718 2,451 101 1,325 1, 100 863 455 161 688 261 -
1964 675 2,344 107 1,281 1,073 839 447 158 644 254 
1963 635 2,237 102 1,215 1,054 745 420 157 607 249 
1962 668 2,165 98 1,129 1,088 699 409 154 570 241 
1961 6'31 2,066 99 1,064 955 657 403 154 532 229 
1960 658 2,055 97 1,bo1 890 574 403 150 480 239 
1959 620 2,051 92 959 842 502 386 150 463 238 
1958 670 2,031 92 879 796 459 387 146 486 236 
1957 638 2,058 88 842 764 447 379 145 468 230 
f-4 
1956 616 2, 103 90 821 729 404 363 143 461 222 ~ 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA (Continued) 
Year Argentina Canada India Israe 1 Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
1955 617 1,982 87 786 701 377 353 140 433 214 
1954 589 1,873 87 716 662 346 335 134 413 204 
1953 578 1,988 85 610 641 330 313 131 388 231 
1952 550 1,966 81 638 600 713 320 125 394 213 
1951 598 1,878 80 638 578 n.a. 317 119 382 202 
1950 591 1,810 78 591 541 n.a. 304 106 320 181 
SOURCE: GNP per Capita, "Growth Rates and Trend Data by Region and Country," Agency for International 
Development. Office of Program Coordination, Statistics and Reports Division, (March 31, 1967). Figures 






PERCENTAGE OF LITERATE POPULATION 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
Average Annual 
Increase (%) .so .11 .27 -.62 .51 .76 .65 1.42 .73 .98 
1965 93.9 99.65 24. 78 85.40 94.11 100 68.6.'j 84.72 90.35 43.10 
1964 93 .4 99.54 24.51 86.02 93.64 100 68.00 83.30 89.12 42~12 
1963 92.9 99.43 24.24 86.64 93 .13 · 100 67 .35 81.98 88.89 41.14 
1962 92.5 99~32 23.97 87.28 92.62 99.32. 66.70 80.56 88.16 40.16 
1961 91.9 98.21 23.70 87.90 92.11 98.56 66.05 79.16 87 .43 39.08 
1960 91.4 98.10 21.63 87.50 91.60 97.8 65.4 77. 74 86 •. 70 38.1 
1959 90.9 99.99 21.36 88.12 89.98 97.02 62.55 76 .. 32 88.87 40.82 
1958 90.4 - 97.88 21.09 88.74 89.47 96.28 61.90 74.90 88.14 39.84 
1957 89.9 97. 77 20.82 89.36 88.96 95.52 61.25 68.14 87.41 38.86 
r-8 
1956 89.4 97.66 20.55 89.98 88.45 94. 76 60.50 67.72 86.68 - 37 .88 ~ 
PERCENTAGE OF LITERATE POPULATION (Continued) 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain 
1955 88.9 97.55 20.28 90.60 87.94 94.00 59.95 66.30 85.95 
1954 88.4 97 .44 . 20.01 91.22 87 .43 93.24 59.30 65.68 85.22 
1953 87.9 97.33 19.84 91.84 86.92 92.48 58.75 64.26 84.59 
1952 87.4 97.22 19.57 92.46 86.41 91. 72 58.10 62.84 83.86 
-
1951 86.9 97 .11 19.30 93.08 85.90 90.9 57 .45 61.42 83.13 
1950 86.4 97 19.03 93·. 7 85.49 90.2 56.8 60.0 82.4 
SOURCES: Bruce M. Russett, World Handbook..21 Social ~ Political Indicators, (New York, 1964), 












'·· " TABLE VIII 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
-
Average Annual 
.34a .22 .18 .39 .23 .64 .60 2.3b .44 .26 Increase (%) 
1965 52 40.5 14.5 62.8 32.9 50.1 33 . 45.2 45.4 21 
1964 51. 7 40.2 14.3 62.4 32.6 49.5 32.4 42.9· 45.9 20.8 
1963 51.3 40 14.1 62 32.4 48.8 31.8 41.6 45.5 20.5 
1962 51.0 39.8 13 .9 66.6 32.2 48.2 31.2 39.3 45.1 20.7 
1961 50.6 39.6 13 .8 61.2 32 47.5 30.6 37 44.6 20 
1960 50.3 39.4 13 .6 60.9 31. 7 46.9 30 34. 7 44.2 19.7 
1959 ~o 39.1 13. 4 60.5 31.5 46.3 29.4 32.4 43. 7 19.5 
1958 49.6 38.8 13. 2 60.1 31.3 45.6 28.8 30.1 43.3 19.2 
1957 49.3 38.6 13 57.7 31 45 28.2 27.8 42.8 18.9 
I-' 
1956 48.9 38.4 12.9 57.3 30.8 43.3 27.6 25.5 42.4 18.7 8t 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS (Continued) 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
1955 48.6 38.2 12.7 56.9 30.5 43. 7 27 24.2 42 18.4 
1954 48 37.9 12.s 56.5 30.3 43 .1 26.4 21.9 41.5 18.2 
1953 47.9 37.7 12.3 56.1 30 42.4 25.8 19.6 41.1 17.9 
1952 47.6 37.5 12 .1 55.7 29.8 41.8 25.2 17.3 40.6 17 .6 
1951 47.2 37.3 12 55.3 29.6 41.1 24.6 15 40.2 17 .4 
1950 46.8 37.1 11.8 55 29.3 40.5 24 12.7 39.8 17.1 
SOURCE: Russet, unless otherwise noted. 
aThe Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period, (United Nations, 1964), p. 76. 
bPopulation Growth and Manpower in the Philippines, (United Nations, 1960), p. 72, (population ~- -- -~ 





PERCENTA~E OF WORK FORCE IN NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan. Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
Average Annual .46 .80 .10 - .10 1.15 1.47 .87 .70 1.15 .90 Increase ('ro) 
1965 82 91 30 88 76 73 48 41 65 28 
1964 81 89 27 88 75 73 46 43 65 25 
19.63 81 89 30 86 74 67 46 43 59 25 
1962 81 89 30 87 74 . 60 46 42 51 25 
1961 15 88 29 83 72 60 42 . 41 51 23 
1960 75 88 29 . 83 70 60 42 41 51 23 
1959 75 87 29 84 70 60 42 41 51 23 
1958 15 87 29 82 70 61 42 43 50 23. 
1957 75 87 29 83 69 61 42 43 51 23 
1--1 
1956 · 75 81 29 88 58 52 42 31 51 14 ~ 
PERCENTAGE OF WORK FORCE IN NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS (Continued) 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico .. The Philippines Spain Turkey 
1955 75 81 29 89 60 53 42 31 51 14 
~ . - . 
1954* n.a. n.a:. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. .n. a. 
* 
1953 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1952 76 84 n.a. 89 61 52 42 33 48 14 
1951 75 81 n.a. 89 n.a. 53 35 31 48 14 
1950 75 79 n.a. n.a. n.a. 51 35 31 48 14 
SOURCE: International Agricultur~l Qrgani_zation Pr.Q_duct_io_n _Xear.Q_o_ok, 1951-1966. 
-






DAILY NEWSPAPER COPIES PER 1,000 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
Average Annual 
Increase (%) -1.18 -1.2 .12 -1.82 .30 4.64 1.33 -.18 1.86 .60 
1965 148 227 12 143 113 451 116 17 153 45 
1964: 147 227 12 143 111 439 151 17 153 45 
1963 146 223 12 143 117 416 119 18 153 45 
1962 169 223 13 148 122 416 109 18 110 45 
1961 162 222 12 170 101 416 83 17 ~90 45 
1960 155 222 11 190 101 396 79 18 70 51 
1959 155 221 10 210 101 389 51 17 70 50 
1958 180 232 4 210 102 386 50 18 71 49 
1957 179 236 8 210 103 384 50 18 76 46 
!-' 
1956 171 240 8 206 104 382 49 19 81 43 I-' 0 
DAILY N~_WSPAPER goPIES PER· 1,000 (Continued) 
Year Ar~en_tina Canada India Israel Italy Japan · Mexico The Philippines 
. --
1956 171 240 8 206 104 382 49 l<) 
- -
1955 163 248 8 202 105 380 49 19 
-
1954 155 246 8 191 106 378 48 19 
I: 
1953 113 232 8 179 106 376 48 18 
1952 100 246 8 167 107 374 48 18 
1951, 153 2·66 7 201 103 296 47 22 
1950 207 287 6 234 98 219 46 26 





















RADIO SETS PER 1,000 
Year Argentina Canada India Israel Italy Japan Mexico The Philippines Spain Turkey 
Ave rage Annua 1 
3.89 4.43 .26 4.43 3.87 2.9 3.55 1.07 2. 77 1.60 Increase(%) 
1965 309 536 10 288 213 220 206 44 136 77 
1964 281 519 9 269 203 203 184 39 127 71 
1963 267 507 8 250 190 201 169 40 129 54 
1962 229 495 7 235 180 193 157 41 113 52 
1961 190 503 6 215 171 187 97 34 103 59 
1960 167 452 5 194 162 133 95 22 90 49 
1959 164 439 4 188 153 137 93 19 85 48 
1958 160 426 4 182 145 140 92 16 80 46 
1957 156 413 3 176 137 143 90 14 75 43 
1-1 
1956 152 400 3 170 129 146 88 12 69 41 1-i !\) 
RADTO SETS PER 1,000 (Continued) 
Year Argentina ·Canada India Israel Italy · Japan Mexico .The Philippines 
- 1955 148 387 3 163 121 146 87 · 10 
-
1954 144 382 2 154 110 139 85 9 
1953 140 379 2 146 100 13 82 8 
1952 136 376 1 138 89 12 79 7.-
1951 132 373 1 130 79 118 76 6 
1950 128 370 1 122 68 111 73 4 




















Year Argentina Canada . * India Israel Italy · Japan Mexico· The Philippines Spain Turkey * 
Average Annual 
Increase (%) .27 .38 .22 .60 .02 .66 .09 .47 .07 .oo 
1965 21.5 21.4 . 38.4 25.8 19.2 18.6 44.2 24.6 21.3 43 
1964 21.9 23.5 38 .• 4 25.7 19.9 17.7 44.8 25.7 22.2 43 
1963 22.5 24.6 38.4 25.0 19~0 17 .3 44.1 26.0 21.5 43 
1962 23 .o 25.3 38.9 24.9 18.7 17 .1 44.2 28.4 21.3 43 
1961 22.7 26.0 38.9 25.1 18.6 16.9 44.2 27.7 21.3 .43 
1960 22.9 26.7 38.9 26.8 18.3 17.2 44.6 29.6 21.8 43 
1959 23.3 27.4 38.3 26.8 18.3 17 .6 46.0 29.7 21. 7 43 
1958 23.6 27.5 38.3 26.7 17.7 18.1 44.0 29.7 21.8 43 
1957 24.3 28.1 38.3 28.2 18.0 17 .3 46.6 29.9 21.8 43 




BIRTH RATE (Continued) 
Argentina Canada * India Israel Italy Japan 
-
1955 24.3 28.1 41. 7 29.2 18.0 19.4 
1954 24.6 28.5 41. 7 29.2 18.2 20.1 
- -
1953 25.2 28.1 41. 7 32.1 17. 7 21.5 
1952 24.9 27.8 41. 7 33.0 17 .9 23.5 
·- .. 
1951 25.3 27.1 41.7 34.1 18.3 25.4 
-
.1950 25.6 27.1 41. 7 34. 7 19.5 28.2 
SOURCE: United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1951-1966. 
* Estimated annual averages, based on a national sample survey. 
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VARIABLES OF INSTABILITY 
Contained in this appendix are graphs showing the indicated levels 
of instability in each of the 10 countries examined in this study for 
the years 1951 through 1966. For the edification of the reader, each 
graph is accompanied by an explanatory chart citing the political 
event which corre~ponds to the. peaks and troughs on the graphs. It 
should be noted that only the event providing the most illustrative ini-
dication of political stability or instability is cited. For example, 
elections may be overshadowed by terrorism, or terrorism may be over-
shadowed by revolt. In parentheses at the end of each citation is the 
number of the variable of instability as it is ranked in the 26-point 
index of instabi 1i ty, written in full on pages 24 to 26 of this study. 
It might be helpful to the reader to refer to the index while examining 
the graphs, as the numbers on the vertical line of the graph corresponds 
to the numbers in the index. To differentiate between those nations 
which have experienced violent assaults on the constitutional order 
and those which have not, an instability line is drawn across the graph 
at the point where there develops organized armed resistance with the 
intent to seize control of the government. The exclusive source for 




























1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 






1951: No significant activity (()). 
1952: No significant activity (O). 
1953: Elections held, incumbents win (4). 
1954: Three ministers resign (1). 
1955: Ne;, significant activity (0). 
1956: No significant activity (O). 
1957: Elections called one year early, opposition wins (6). 
1958: Special elections, incumbents win (4). 
1959: No significant activity (0). 
1960: Cabinet shuffled (2). 
1961: No significant activity (0). 
1962: Elections called, incumbents win (4). 
1963: Parliament dissolved; elections called, opposition wins (6). 
1964: Cabinet shuffled (2). 
1965: Cabinet shuffled (2). 
1966: Terrorist explodes bomb in Parliament Building (13). 
Note: Elections normally are held at· five-year intervals in Canada; 
however, under a parliamentary system, special elections may be called 
for a variety of reasons, e.g., to gain a larger majority for the in-
cumbents, or in the e.v.ent the incumbent party no longer can command a 




























Ins tabi 1i ty Line 
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1951: Ten persons injured in election-day rioting (9). 
1952: Rioting; Communists reportedly involved (9). 
1953: Terrorists explode bomb in Tel Aviv (13). 
1954: Small riot at Nazareth (9). 
1955: Terrorists explode bomb at political rally (13). 
1956: Minister resigns (1). 
1957: Plot to assassinate political leaders revealed (12). 
1958: Government resigns; new government formed under same leader-
ship (5). 
1959: Government resigns; new government formed under same leader-
ship (5). 
1960: Ministers resign; government remains unchanged (1). 
1961: Students hold protest demonstration (7). 
1962: No significant activity (O). 
120 
1963: Government resigns; new government formed under new leadership 
(6). 
1964: Government resigns; new government formed under same leader-
ship (5). 
1965: Elections held,incumbents win (4). 
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1951: Communists call general strike (8). 
1952: Rioting, Communists and Fascists clash (9). 
1953: Riots, police jail 2,000 persons (9). 
1954: Fanfani government ousted; rioting occurs (9). 
1955: Rioting, Communists clash with Fascists (9). 
1956: Cabinet shuffled (2). 
1957: Demonstrations; Segni government resigns (7). 
1958: Thirty persons hurt in Spinazzola rioting (9). 
1959: Rioting in Rome, Fascists reportedly involved (9). 
1960: Rioting in several areas; Segni, Tambroni governments fall; 
Fanfani returns to power (10). 
1961: Isolated terrorist activity (13). 
1962: Strikes and violence in !urin, 2,000 arrested (8). 
1963: Fanfani government falls; wave of strikes (8). 
1964: Moro resigns, forms new government (4). 
1965: Minister resigns (1). 
1966: Moro resigns; forms new government (4). 
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Note: Use of the word strike in this chart refers to political 
strikes, rather than labc;,r disputes, This period in Italy saw a great 
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1951: Students riot (9). 
1952: Widespread rioting over United States-Japan Peace Treaty; 
several killed, hundreds injured (11). 
1953: Yoshida government falls, returns after elect ions (5). 
1954: Deputies in Diet riot, 50 injured (9). 
1955: Hatoyama government resigns; returned in elections (5). 
1956: Deputies in Diet riot, 30 injured (9). 
1957: Ishibashi government resigns; .Kishi named premier (6). 
1958: Two general strikes; fighting in Diet (9). 
1959: Cabinet shuffled (2). 
1960: Japan-United States treaty negotiations touch off massive riot-
ing; Kishi stabbed, another leader assassinated (14). 
1962: Another plot against government uncovered, eight jailed (12). 
1963.: Elections held, incumbents win (4). 
1964: Students demonstrate (7). 
1965: Thousands hold demonstration at Diet (7). 
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1951: Demonstrations (7). 
1952: Isolated terrorist activity; shootings during election 
campaign ( 13) • 
1953: No significant activity (0). 
1954: Sixteen killed in revolt led by General Guzman (21). 
1955: Twenty-eight killed in rioting in Oaxaca (9). 
1956: Strikes; student riot (9). 
1957: Student riots (9). 
1958: Rioting in several areas (10). 
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1959: Terrorist activity in seven states; several assassinations (15). 
1960~ Thirteen killed in riot in Guerrero (9). 
1961: Riots and uprisings in three states; Pueblo placed under military 
rule ( 16). 
1962: Several riots; Army puts down outbreaks of violence (9). 
1963: Demonstrations against arrest of rightist political leaders (7). 
1964: Rioting in Chihuahua (9). 
1965: Riots in Yucatani guerrillas attack army post, 20 die (9). 
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1951: Rioting in Barcelona, Pamplona, Bilboa, Madrid (10). 
1952: Demonstrations (7). 
1953: Demonstrations (7). 
1954: Rioting accompanies local elections (9). 
1955: Students lead demonstrations (7). 
1956: Government suspends constitut.ional provisions to crack down on 
~rotests and riots (18). 
1957: Franco alleges plot against his government (12). 
1958: Strikes called iri at least five cities; Franco suspends consti-
tutional provisions to restore order (18). 
1959: Sixteen conviced of anti-government plot; terrorists strike in 
Bilboa (13). 
1960: Guerrilla and terrorist. activity reported (13). 
1961: Terrorist activity (13)~ 
1962: Wave of strikes and terrorism; state of emergency declared in 
three provinces (17). 
1963: Numerous bombings; many terrorists executed (14). 
1964: At least six acts of terrorism (13). 
1965: Students organize\hunger strikes and political strikes (8). 
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1951: War between government and Huk rebels, 2·,_oo(l) l{uks reported killed 
in one year (21)• 
1952: Huk rebellion continues, 4,000 reported fighting (21). 
1953: Huk rebellion continues, 20 killed in election violence (21). 
1954: Huk rebellion continues (21). 
1955: Huk rebellion slacks off; at least 23 per.sons die in election 
violence ( 13) • 
1956: Isolated terrorism blamed on Huks (13). 
1957: Army begins new offensive against Huks, 1,000 rebels reported 
still fighting (21). 
1958: Huk rebellion continues (21). 
1959: Eight cities put on emergency basis as result of Huk activity; 
50 persons die in election violence (21). 
1960: Huk war continues; terrorist activity reported (21). 
1961: Huk war continues, 1,200 troops sent to Luzon (21). 
1962: Huk rebellion continues; mayor assassinated in Cavite Province 
(21). 
1963: Huk war slacks off; six election-connected murders confirmed 
( 14). 
1964: No significant activity reported (0). 
1965: Huk rebellion picks up, 14,000 Huks reported active and in con-
trol of 80 villages; 31 killed during election campaign (21). 
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1951: Small civil war reported. in Assam (21). 
1952: Widespread terrorist activity (15). 
1953: Central government assumes control of East Punjab to curb alleged 
Communist influence (16). 
1954: Central Government assumes control of Andhra (16). 
1955: Naga tribesmen revolt, about 300 reported kUled (21). 
1956: Naga war continues, about 350 killed (21). 
1957: Nag a war continues, 295 deaths reported (21). 
1958: Nag a war continues, 1,369 reported killed (21). 
1959: • Nji\ga war continues; violence erupts in Kerala (21). 
1960: Nag a war continues; clashes in Assam continue (21). 
19611 Naga war continues (21). 
1962: Naga war continues; internal violence slacks off with attack by 
Chinese (21). 
1963: Naga sabotage reported (13). 
1964: Naga activity picks up; central government assumes control of 
Kerala after state government falls (21). 
1965: Central government maintains control of Kerala after Communists 
win state elections (16). 
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1951: Cabinet resigns, new cabinet formed under same leadership (3). 
' 1952: Isolat~d terrorist activity (13). 
1953: Ministers resign (1). 
1954: Twenty arrested in plot against government (12). · 
1955: Riots erupt over Cyprus issue (9). 
1956: Martial iaw declared (19). 
1957: Troops c.alled to que 11 rioting in Ankara (9). 
1958: Elections postponed (18). 
1959: Isolated terrorist activity- (13). 
1960: Military overthrows Menderes government (25). 
1961: Menderes supporters attempt counter-coup (23). 
1962: Army group attempts to overthrow Inonu (23). 
1963: Army group-attempts another- coup, six executed; martial law 
declared (23). 
1964: Isolated terrorist activity; attempt made to .assassinate 
Inonu ( 13). 
1965: Inonu government falls, new government formed by Justice Party 
under Demirel; 15 hul;'t in rioting (9). 
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1951: Army revolt attempt crushed (23). 
1952: Isolated terrorist activity (13). 
1953: Terrorism stepp~d up, b9lllbing and arson reported (15). 
1954: ];>eron sets up extra-constitutional "super-cabinet" (18). 
1955: Peron ousted in armed revolt, military junta seizes control (26). 
1956: Peron forces crushed in counter-revolt; martial law declared 
(23). 
1957: Numerous acts of terrorism reported (15). 
1958: R.io~s and strikes accompany election, 30-day state of seige 
declared with constitutional rights suspended (18). 
1959: Military coup thwarted (23). 
1960: Military coup thwarted (23). 
1961: Military coup thwarted (23). 
1962: Frondizi govermnent overthrown by military (25). 
1963: Military coup thwarted (23). 
1964: Central govermnent assume$ control. of state of Jujay, removes 
governor and dissolves legislature (16). · 
1965: Widespread terrorism (15). 
1966: Illia goverrunent li:iVer.thrown by military junta (25). 
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